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Preface 
 
I take interest in us persons and in our everyday lived lives taking place here in 
our daily environments. I believe that we persons are always situated through our 
bodies in a physical context, - although our thoughts may be about situations and 
places very different and distant from that of our current bodily fixed situationality. I 
believe that in our thoughts we can move along the time line of past, present, and 
future while our living bodies always at any given time link us to a particular 
situationality in the physical world. 
My essay, having the title of what we see, as contrasted with, what we ought to 
see, is based on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s (1908-1961) philosophical position. 
Merleau-Ponty is a representative of phenomenology. The read line running through 
my essay is the role of senses as our initial contact with the world, and therefore also 
the role of the body as a continual attachment to the world in which we live. Thus, 
Merleau-Ponty reopens the problem of a sense experience after Descartes.  
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception includes the sphere of the visual 
arts as an intertwined aspect of his philosophical position. I will follow in this 
tradition. Merleau-Ponty discusses the Modern visual arts which were prevailing 
during his time. I will bring along the Contemporary site-specific and situational 
artwork since the late 1990s. 
My essay is divided into three parts. The Part 1, - Casting the Case -, puts forward 
the underlying big question of this essay, namely what does the situationality, in terms 
of our bodily existence and our direct bodily contact with the world, have to do with 
that of having access to something that leads to knowledge about us persons and the 
exterior world? This question will be further discussed with the help of the guiding 
question of what do we see.  
The Part 2, - Contrasting the Case -, takes a step back to the history. In this Part 2 
Merleau-Ponty’s view is further contrasted with the traditional theories of empiricism 
and intellectualism in the Cartesian tradition.  
The Part 3, - Compromising the Case -, builds a bridge between Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological position put forward in 1945 and the current day Contemporary 
site-specific and situational artworks since late 1990s. In the Part 3 my solution for 
Merleau-Ponty’s wish to unify the spheres of extreme subjectivism and the extreme 
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objectivism discussed in Part 2 is put forward in the light of the Contemporary site-
specific and situational artworks. 
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Part 1 - Casting the Case 
 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
1.1 Introducing my interest and the underlying question 
I take interest in us persons and in our everyday lived lives taking place here in 
our daily environments. I am interested in situations and in situationality. I believe 
that we persons are always situated through our bodies in a physical context, - 
although our thoughts may be about situations and places very different and distant 
from that of our current bodily fixed situationality. In our thoughts we can move 
along the time line of past, present, and future while our living bodies always at any 
given time link us to a particular situationality in the physical world. With the other 
words, through our thought process, metaphorically, we are able to leave our bodies 
behind and situate ourselves in environments beyond the temporary reach of our 
physiological existence. In all of these activities the physical world exist as a context 
of these actions. I take it given that the physical world is here, independent of us 
persons. My common sense thinking reflects my practical experience and tells me that 
the worlds stays, while the generations pass. I take notice that someone gives birth to 
a new life, while someone else dies. I take this to be practical knowledge about our 
ordinary daily lives. I am curious about how we persons are situated here in the world, 
in these settings, in this practical sphere of situationality. I am curious about how do 
we have knowledge of these situations in which we are directly attached by our 
physical existence. This interest of mine has its roots, in addition to philosophy, in my 
theoretical and practical background of visual arts and architecture. - Now, if you 
prefer to think along the lines of analytical approach to philosophy, the underlying 
very big question of this essay is that what does the situationality, in terms of our 
bodily existence and our direct bodily contact with the world, have to do with that of 
having access to something that leads to knowledge about us persons and the exterior 
world?  
Analytically, the above question is understood as an epistemological question 
dealing with the theory of knowledge. Further, along the analytical approach, in this 
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essay, I intend to give light and reflect over the above large epistemological question 
with the help of a guiding question of what do we see? - Notice that as with the world, 
I do not doubt if the world exists or not, I take it given that it exists. Also, I believe 
that we can have knowledge of us persons and the things around us. I do not question 
if we can have knowledge or not. Nor do I question the importance of the knowledge. 
After this has been said, I assume that the reader has solid reasons to question my 
point of spending time with the above epistemological question, which is not new, by 
any means, in the Western philosophical tradition. The above question has been asked 
and answered, based on reason, a time after a time, by the traditional theories of 
empiricism and intellectualism ever since the beginning of the Western philosophical 
tradition. - Further more, by the opinions of many, the above question has been 
answered more than sufficiently enough along the lines of these traditional theories 
based on rationality. 
 
1.2 Reasons for asking the underlying question 
Now, let me try to give you a short overview which sets forth my motivation for 
attempting to establish something fresh concerning the above underlying big question. 
First of all, notice that, to start with, I just simply describe, by using a very basic 
language, a situation which interests me. Then, I translate, - or with the other words -, 
I explain and compress my puzzlement about our practical and direct involvement in 
the world into a question using the analytical terminology. It is very important that the 
reader will keep these two paralleling approaches of describing and 
analyzing/explaining in his or her mind. I will get back to this parallelism in more 
detail in this essay, a time after a time. For the time being, just take notice of this 
paralleling approach. 
Secondly, it is important to say a few words about the formulation of the 
underlying big question expressed in the terms of the analytical approach. Notice how 
the openness and the formulation of the question points towards a transitory position. 
The openness of the question is achieved by not including the ambitious aim of 
certainty. Traditionally the quality of certainty has been holding the most valuable and 
priced post, as a standard of measure, in the Western epistemological thought. In my 
formulation of the underlying big question, I have all together left out that of 
demanding a defined and definite standard of measure for knowledge about us 
persons and the exterior world. I do not ask what can we have true knowledge of, and 
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how can we gain this true knowledge, as it is asked in the traditional epistemological 
sense. The element of transitoriness is expressed by my emphasis of asking how to 
search access to knowledge. The term access implies that the search for knowledge is 
taking place through something. And this something in this essay is to be understood 
as a transitory position placed in us persons, and more exactly, in our direct bodily 
contact with the world. Thus, the question of how to search access to an initial 
moment which will light up something fresh to us and eventually provide us with 
some new knowledge about us and the world, is directing me to study our bodily 
awareness as experienced in the situations we daily are part of. I believe that it is 
important to establish that the uncertain, undefined, unclear, strange, and 
indeterminate initial moment is as something certain in the way that this initial 
moment is the true start for that of searching access to knowledge. Further, this 
transitoriness also implies that the initial situation is not static but dynamic. This 
initial situation is to be taken developed through different stages from its initial level 
to the levels of something more defined and clear. This refers to the process of 
learning. Thus, I take interest in how could our elementary and direct bodily contact 
with the world give raise to an event which is transformed through learning into 
something which opens up a new dimension of knowledge to us.  
Thirdly, as it is implied, throughout the times in the Western analytical 
philosophical tradition, the natural sciences have exercised authority and domination 
over the practical sphere, for clear and powerful reasons. A time after a time, new life 
saving and life advancing scientific discoveries within neurosciences, physics and 
chemistry, and so on, are published around the world.  In the eyes of the traditional 
analytical philosophy, the value of objective and calculating rational thought based on 
reason and law-like causal relations is more reliable and certain over the more 
uncertain, more unreliable and more dubitable, contingent knowledge received 
through our bodily awareness, with the other words, through our senses.  
The point, that I want to make, is that I believe that the basic knowledge includes 
more than just certain and scientific knowledge alone. A certain and absolute 
knowledge is traditionally based on reason and scientific laws and formulas, and 
therefore I take the certain and absolute knowledge to belong to the theoretical sphere. 
And this again leads back to the issue of that of being a person, and what is the 
essence of being a person. I take that the scientific and theoretical standpoint is not 
enough alone to describe what it is to be a person. The scientific and theoretical 
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sphere has ignored and forgotten the value and potentiality, and the situationality of 
our everyday life, and that we learn new things throughout our life, and that we need 
to constantly adjust the standpoints we take and the perspectives which we carry, 
therefore also recomposing our understanding of ourselves and the world which we 
are part of. We are not born as fully developed and functioning creatures, and by the 
time we leave this world, we still have not reached the state of perfect development 
and the level of equally perfect functioning. 
The overall aim of this essay is to sketch another, more including approach 
towards that of searching and gaining knowledge, than it has traditionally been done, 
through theorizing along the lines of analytical philosophy, based on the standard of 
certainty. But don’t get me wrong, - I want to emphasize that by no means am I after 
to deny the value of certain, scientific knowledge -, all I am saying is that I believe 
that there is more to knowledge and to that of grasping us persons and our lives, than 
what the scientific approach alone can provide. Analytical approach alone does not 
lead to the entire answer how it is to be, and what is essential to that of being a 
person. There is nothing wrong in the scientific, epistemological approach as long as 
it stays with its own sphere of objective knowledge, in the context of the scientific 
knowledge and experiments. But the traditional epistemological approach is not 
giving and revealing the full story of the human life. If we want to reveal somewhat 
more complete story of the human life and knowledge, we need to take a step back, 
and revise the old epistemological question. Analytically understood, now I have 
given a short overview consisting of my reasons for wishing to modify the traditional 
epistemological question aiming to establish knowledge which has its standard of 
measure in nothing less than certainty. I hope to return on the agenda that of being 
bodily involved in the world, with the other words, the scope of the difficult practical 
sphere with no absolute rules and laws.  
 
1.3 The method of describing  
Now, remember that the analytical method will not be the sole method applied in 
this essay. As I already mentioned, parallel to the analytical method I will run the 
method of describing, which is somewhat “anti-analytical”. - I believe that describing 
is the method that is suitable to the practical sphere. My approach will be to study this 
bodily awareness by describing our everyday basic life. I will be discussing such 
elementary situations such as seeing an apple, a glass, a boat, a CD Disk, a chair, a 
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table, a landscape in a misty weather and another landscape during a clear day, a blue 
patch against a grey background, a line drawing of a black square on a piece of white 
paper, and so on. The approach of describing is very tricky, since it does not apply the 
analytical method. The method of describing accepts the seen as it is, without trying 
to see or understand more than the situation gives raise to. Accepting this approach 
will be probably very difficult for the analytical reader. But keep in mind, that 
accepting this approach based on describing, is the key to understand my essay. Just 
hold onto this thought for now, and don’t worry about being uncertain how to grasp 
the method of describing. The method of describing will be clear to the reader by the 
time the reader have finished up reading this essay. Throughout this essay, I will 
provide a key after a key, needed for grasping the method and the significance of 
describing. This again will add a perspective after a perspective, and therefore reveal 
a depth after a depth on the ongoing discussion.  
 
1.4 The issue of perspectivism 
Now, we have added that of perspectivism into the discussion. That of 
perspectivism adds another important parallel to the ongoing discussion in this essay. 
Parallel to the analysis of the traditional epistemological question I will have a 
perspectivist view dealing with the question of knowledge. Perspectivism will be 
forming an important part of this essay. As a starting point, for now, I will accept that 
the perspective, which I carry, is colored and shaded by my direct contact with the 
world, and thereby by my situationality in the world. Further, my perspective is 
shaped by my practical and theoretical background, strongly influenced by the 
material I have been reading. - In analytical way of understanding this perspectivism, 
is as to say that my, or any person’s viewpoint is characterized as seeing through 
one’s personal filter, in the Kantian sense. But I will not aim for objective and 
universal guiding principles along the lines of Kant. I will not attempt to take a “‘view 
from nowhere’”1, or the “‘God’s eye view’”2 in the extreme objective3 way 
attempting to eliminate one’s personal involvement with the world. I am quite 
convinced that by now the reader has formed an idea that my standpoint is not that of 
                                                
1 Matthews, Merleau-Ponty A Guide for the Perplexed, reference to Tomas Nagel and his essay A view 
from nowhere, p. 38. 
2 Matthews, Merleau-Ponty A Guide for the Perplexed, reference to Descartes and his Six Meditations, 
p. 41. 
3 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenoøogy of Perception, p. xxii. 
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the traditional standpoint aiming for extreme objectivity. Equally importantly, I want 
to emphasize that neither will I take the opposite extreme view point, namely, that of 
extreme subjectivism4. I take that the extreme subjectivism collapses into solipsism 
saying that only the self can be known to exist5. The extreme subjectivism grounds 
everything on the private personal experience, and therefore looses contact and the 
joint basis for interaction with the world, including that of the other human beings, - 
although, ironically, its object of its study was initially the objective world. Along 
with similar lines, the supporter of the extreme objectivism seems to forget that 
initially it is the objectivist himself or herself as a scientist who theorizes and is 
involved in experiments. The theorizing takes place through a person carrying a status 
of a scientist. I assume the reader is now wondering what is the position and view 
which I intend to take.  
 
1.5 The spheres of objectivism and subjectivism 
In the coming sentences I will be pointing towards the deeper core of this essay, 
and therefore also towards the position which I intend to establish. My viewpoint will 
be initially based on recognizing that we persons are subjects who are in direct contact 
with the world. But since the world exists independently of us subjects, the world is 
also the object which we are looking at. This gives birth to the acknowledgement of 
the objective sphere in addition to the subjective sphere. This is, in a nutshell, my 
starting position for that of attempting to describe our everyday life with the help of 
the question of what do we see. - Analytically understood, this points towards 
reopening the question of sense experience. 
Thus, the relation between the objective sphere and the subjective sphere is in the 
very core of the discussion in this essay. The point I wish to make in this essay is that 
uncertainty and indeterminate, and vagueness, - as the initial stages of grasping 
something and learning, - are to be seen carrying importance. The sphere of certain 
knowledge, aimed to be reached both by the traditional theories of empiricism (in its 
outmost seen as extreme subjectivism) and intellectualism empiricism (in its outmost 
seen as extreme objectivism), is just one aspect of knowledge we are able to have, but 
it does not cover the entire aspect/scale of that of being a person. In the contrary, I do 
not wish to unmystify the irrational and non-law like aspects of that of being a person 
                                                
4 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenoøogy of Perception, p. xxii. 
5 The New Lexicon, Webster’s Dictionary of the English Language, p. 944. 
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and living an ordinary life. I wish to accept these aspects of that of being a person, 
and to recognize the essence and importance of them.  
To sum up until now, by this point it has been sketch that it is of essence to have a 
more including and open approach to knowledge. Knowledge is not be defined by the 
standard of certainty alone. It is important to look into the often ignored practical 
sphere as a source of knowledge. It is us persons who have this transitory position as a 
key position for that of having access to the uncountable changes of discovering 
different initial moments towards knowledge. If we understand our position in the 
world, we can understand how to gain access to knowledge. We cannot understand 
how to have access to knowledge, without understanding our own position.  I take 
that in the first place we are initially in contact with the world through our sense 
experience, so we have to trust to this position some what since we cannot leave it 
behind, nor can we ignore or deny it. Nor does it help to doubt it. I simply accept this 
position and start my work from this bodily grounded earthly position. I am just 
curious how to grasp the value of it and how to describe this value which I believe is 
found in that of intertwining the subjective sphere and the objective sphere. - Now the 
question has become to how to set light on the importance of the practical sphere? Or 
is this just another ambitious goal to be reached, possibly collapsing into its own 
impossibility? Now we need the perspective shift that will allow us to look at the 
world at fresh.  
 
1.6 Seeing our ordinary, practical life thought the Contemporary visual arts 
And this takes me back to the initial question dealing with that of searching access 
to knowledge, and the transitory position in us persons. We need to take a new look  
of our daily lives, in hope to discover something that has been traditionally overseen, 
to what we have been “blind” to until now. In order to be able to relook at ourselves 
and our involvement in our daily environments at new, it is necessary with a slight 
shift of positions. We need to get hold on to a new and fresh perspective, without 
loosing contact with our subjective sphere, and without stepping too far to the side 
into the objective sphere. In the core of this new perspective is the subject-object 
relation and that of unifying the far end objectivism and the far end subjectivism. This 
needed shift of a perspective, while still being in oneself, while also being able to look 
at the situation at new, is provided by that of involving the sphere of the 
Contemporary visual arts into discussion.  
 14 
And parallel to the sphere of the Contemporary visual arts, now it is at its place to 
bring along the guiding question of what do we see. Remember, this question was 
introduced in the very beginning of this essay, in the second paragraph. The purpose 
of bringing along this question is to ask questions about what we see and eventually 
with the help of these questions to relearn to look at our everyday life at new. With 
the other words, we need a shift of a perspective concerning our customized blindness 
towards all of this so familiar around us. This shift of positions, while accepting our 
subjective grip in the situationality, and simultaneously adding the objective 
“stepping-on-the-side-gaze”, for further development and reflection over the 
experienced, is provided by looking at these everyday situations in the context of the 
visual arts. By visual arts, I do not mean visual arts generally. In the contrary, I find 
that the needed perspective shift is realized in the context of certain Contemporary 
site-specific and situational visual art projects since the late 1990s. More exactly, in 
these particular examples, which I will introduce more in detail towards the end of 
this essay, more exactly in the Part 3, one can literally walk into a piece of art. An 
atmosphere and environment is created and constructed where even the air between is 
an important part of the artwork. In many cases the entire gallery is transformed into 
one single large-scale piece of artwork, expanding from room to room, from floor to 
floor. Therefore, in that instant when one enters the gallery, one becomes a part of the 
art setting. In one way this is to be understood that one leaves one’s everyday life 
behind, while being served and involved in a new setting of an everyday life in the 
context of the gallery. And not only this, but the artwork is set in a position for use. 
One is not a passive element of the setting of an artwork, but rather, one has an active 
role in this often puzzling, while still familiar, setting. These works of arts involve us 
in different activities. One could be involved in cooking, in that of using chairs and 
tables of accurate sizes in a gallery situation. The traditional distance between that of 
being a subject looking at an object is not there in the traditional sense. The subject-
object relation is intertwined. In this setting, the subject himself has become an object 
of this particular Contemporary artwork. Both our direct bodily attachment in the 
situation, as well as our ability to reflect over the experienced situation, are 
challenged. Thus the practical and theoretical spheres are activated. This is to be 
understood like a total environment giving a new perspective to our everyday life. 
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Through this we can learn to look at the world at new. And thereby also discover the 
things how they really are as seen by the pre-reflective perception.6 These objects 
revealed are shaped by their context and eventually made sense in our consciousness 
through the process of learning.  
Now I have sketched for the reader the large frame for this essay. The details are 
to be discovered along the way, forming a more coherent and sound perspectivist 
holism of my view. This is as if I have cast the case, as the title of this part 1 refers to. 
The set is given, the actors of empiricism, intellectualism, and phenomenalism are 
introduced, each having their distinguished role. The challenge remains to see if these 
actors, who have quite different vocabulary and language almost if they live in 
different worlds, are to be able to communicate with each other. In the end, naturally, 
it is left for the reader to ponder over, and to decide on if this view is worth of taking 
into consideration or not. My viewpoint is just one view point of many different 
possible paths found among a wide range of philosophical courses. For now I have 
chosen to follow the phenomenological course, consisting of describing the practical 
life. Thus, my philosophical viewpoint is not mine to start with. My philosophical 
viewpoint has its roots deeply grounded in the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-
Ponty.  The difference is that I am putting forward my interpretation of the puzzle 
faced by Merleau-Ponty, in the light of his phenomenology, as well as I am 
attempting to see the puzzle of intertwining the subjective and objective spheres taken 
closer to being solved in the present day context of the Contemporary visual arts. The 
part concerning the context of the Contemporary visual arts is my contribution to the 
discussion put forward by Merleau-Ponty. Now it is time to say a few words about my 
choice of literature and equally importantly, how to read this literature, and therefore 
also, how to read my essay.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
6 Matthews, Merleau-Ponty A Guide for the Perplexed, p. 20 and 135. 
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Chapter 2 - The underlying literature and how to read my 
essay 
 
2.1 The underlying literature 
Now it is the time to introduce the literature on which my view is relaying. I have 
strongly anchored, almost as if I have one-sidedly adhered my position in the writings 
of a French phenomenologist, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961). His philosophical 
position is the source behind the way I see us persons and the world, the questions 
which I ask, and bringing in the discipline of the visual arts. Thus, take it that 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical position is strongly reflected in the above introductory 
section of my essay, through my interpretation of his position. 
My understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological position is based on 
three sources. Two of these sources are direct sources written by Merleau-Ponty 
himself. The most comprehensive of these sources is his book, Phenomenology of 
Perception, published in 1945. The second book, The World of Perception, published 
in 19487, is more compact, but by no means of a lesser value for me. I take this 
second book to give a compressed version of Merleau-Ponty’s book, Phenomenology 
of Perception. This second book, The World of Perception, follows a form of seven 
lectures discussing the main issues of his phenomenological view of perception. As a 
matter of fact, initially, these seven lectures were delivered on French radio by 
Merleau-Ponty in its publishing year. The third source is an indirect source written by 
Eric Matthews as a guide for understanding Merleau-Ponty. I do appreciate the title of 
this book, namely, Merleau-Ponty, A Guide for the Perplexed. This is a very recent 
book, first published in 2006. 
First of all, my understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological position is 
initially based on an introductory section of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of 
Perception8. Merleau-Ponty’s introductory section gives an overview how the 
                                                
7 By Routledge, first translated into English in 2004. 
8 Merleau-Ponty’s book, Phenomenology of Perception is considered probably as his most influential 
work. It was written during his early years. This major work was published during this same time 
period. Initially it was first published only in French in 1945, the English version did not come out 
before 1961. The book has been considered by many as a great philosophical achievement in its 
originality and influentiality in the 20th Century philosophy. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology was very 
quickly recognized as an important statement of French existentialism representing a standpoint distinct 
from his temporaries of Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir among others, reaching far beyond 
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theories of empiricism and intellectualism in the Cartesian tradition are flawed in their 
search for knowledge by ignoring the value of the pre-objective position found in our 
daily, practical lives. This pre-objective position in Merleau-Ponty’s terminology is 
the same as the position which I have explained in the introductory chapter of this 
essay, namely, in short, this position is based on our direct bodily involvement in the 
world, as an initial position before one starts reflecting over this initial position. Thus, 
this is straight to the point which I made in the beginning of this essay by raising the 
big underlying question about knowledge. Here is to be located the origin of my 
question. But take notice that Merleau-Ponty does not explicit ask this question. 
Further, it is in his lengthy introductory part where Merleau-Ponty forms a frame 
around his own phenomenological view, parallel to the criticism of the traditional 
theories. These two aspects go hand in hand for Merleau-Ponty. As already 
mentioned, this is what I call in my essay “casting the case”, with the other words, 
setting the stage for the coming discussion taking place in Part 2 of this essay. 
Through his dialogue with the empiricists and the intellectualists Merleau-Ponty 
establishes the need for re-opening the question concerning our body and the sense 
experience.  
Secondly, I have added the material from his seven lectures concerning with the 
phenomenology of perception, in order to get an overview of his position, as well as 
simultaneously proving a frame for me to bring in the sphere of visual arts into the 
discussion. This standpoint is finally analyzed and processed and seen in vigor with 
the help of Matthews. Through this process I have formed my own position which is 
                                                                                                                                       
merely philosophical debates. Theorists, critics, and artists working with visual arts have been 
influenced and inspired, as well as they have taken and carried further the started phenomenological 
course. This has been taking place ever since the publication of 1945 up to the current date. - In this 
essay, there is no room to expand the discussion to cover a large segment of French existentialism. Nor 
is there room to go into a discussion concerning the roots of existentialism placed in the writings of 
Husserl. Husserl is known as the founder of the phenomenological movement further carried on by 
another German philosopher, namely Heidegger who also has been as an assistant to Husserl. Nor is 
here room to the writings of Kierkegaard and his Sickness unto Death although many parallels can be 
caught between the lines. Kierkegaard is the source behind my earlier interest of intertwining the 
positions of extreme subjectivism and the extreme objectivism (ref. Kierkegaard’s positions of “as near 
as [one] can be to itself” and “when furthest away from itself” as well as the “process of growing self-
awareness” and that “becoming is a movement from some place, but becoming oneself is a movement 
at that place”. Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, p. 62, 22, 66.) The same applies for the anti-
dogmatic position of Nietzsche. Although again, equally many similarities can be found referring to the 
perspectivist view of Nietzsche as to the Kierkegaard’s view concerning with the personal choice and 
self-awareness. No, instead, I will go straight into the discussion concerning Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology. The point here is just to emphasize that Merleau-Ponty is quite distinct from his 
countrymen and -women dealing with the issues of existentialism. This applies especially to his interest 
in visual arts. This is an interest which I share with Merleau-Ponty. 
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very much that of Merleau-Ponty’s. - It is of essence for me that Merleau-Ponty is a 
philosopher who explicit, through out his philosophical position involves the sphere 
of visual arts as an intertwined part of describing his philosophical position. That of 
looking at philosophy in the light of the Modern arts provides Merleau-Ponty the 
needed perspective shift, so that we are able to look at our everyday life at fresh. I 
would like to mention that in his book, The World of Perception, the sphere of 
Modern arts follows Merleau-Ponty in each of his seven lectures. The message of 
these lectures is given in a unity of Modern arts and his phenomenology, contrasted 
with the traditional theories of empiricism and the intellectualism in the Cartesian 
tradition. 
Thirdly, Merleau-Ponty himself discussed explicitly Descartes’ Meditations and 
the respective claims and arguments throughout his Phenomenology of Perception. 
With the other words, Merleau-Ponty’s own position is highlighted in the light of 
Descartes. Merleau-Ponty obviously finds Descartes’ writings very fascinating and 
even complete within their own closed intellectual sphere, but Merleau-Ponty does 
not find the Cartesian based intellectualism proving a solid fundament how to 
establish true knowledge concerning the persons, their lives and the world. Merleau-
Ponty shows a deep and detailed understanding of Descartes position. This is also to 
be understood that the writings of Descartes have colored and influenced Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophical way of thinking in his conviction that the intellectualism in the 
Cartesian tradition has ignored the value of the practical sphere in its approach.  
More exactly, Merleau-Ponty is a great example of that of daring to value and the 
essence of our direct bodily involvement in the world after Descartes devalued the 
reliability of knowledge gained by senses second to intelligent. Merleau-Ponty is also 
a philosopher who discusses Descartes, down to the exact examples given by 
Descartes himself in his Meditations, in impressing and complex detail, a time after a 
time, each time just seeing the problem from a slightly different perspective. Parallel 
to his phenomenological way of thinking, Merleau-Ponty discusses and keeps the 
traditional theories of empiricism and intellectualism in the Cartesian tradition with 
him all the way as a contrasting element to his own phenomenological way of 
thinking. This is his way of presenting his phenomenological position, while also in 
the light of the traditional theories, making this phenomenological position 
understandable and accessible to a reader in the analytical tradition. As already made 
mark of, I have chosen to continue in my essay in this tradition. Although the big 
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difference between Merleau-Ponty’s and my writing approach is that I do put forward 
an underlying question as well as a guiding question while Merleau-Ponty does not. I 
will also attempt to follow a more step by step structure of presenting my way of 
understanding Merleau-Ponty, as well as putting forward my solution of taking the 
course of Merleau-Ponty, hopefully, a step closer to where Merleau-Ponty himself 
hoped to arrive. Another way of understanding Merleau-Ponty’s parallelism is that his 
own theory has its roots in his way of understanding the traditional theories of 
empiricism and intellectualism, in the elements which he found interesting and 
potential, but flawed. Merleau-Ponty does not deny these traditional theories, but can 
be understood as taking the best of each theory and modifying the aspects which he 
finds flawed, towards a better course. Merleau-Ponty adds another depth to 
understanding our bodily awareness on Part I - the Body, in his Phenomenology of 
Perception.  
For the reference I would like to mention, that my understanding of Descartes’ 
Meditations on the First Philosophy is based on the book, The Philosophical Writing 
of Descartes, as well as this is further supplied by Routledge Philosophy Guidebook 
to Descartes and the Meditations. Naturally, my understanding of Descartes has been 
further strongly influenced by the writings of Merleau-Ponty, as it should be clear for 
the reader by now. I find this material very actual and activating, as well as in demand 
of further reflection. 
Fourth, as already mentioned, to the direct, complex, demanding and challenging 
material provided by Merleau-Ponty, I have added the secondary source on Merleau-
Ponty by Matthews. This has been of great value for me. Matthews’ account has 
functioned as a guiding, controlling and confirming element so that I have been able 
to actively test my understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. That of getting 
familiar with Matthews’ view has provided me with a great opportunity not only to 
compare my understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s original texts with Matthews’ 
understanding of this very thorough, layered and perspectivist philosopher dealing 
with issues of phenomenological philosophy and Modern arts in deep complexity, but 
also it has helped me to form my own position as a continuation of the process started 
by Merleau-Ponty. Matthews does along the lines of Merleau-Ponty, explicit discuss 
the Modern arts and the view of Descartes throughout his book, but Matthews does 
not include the sphere of Contemporary arts into the discussion. Adding the sphere of 
Contemporary arts into the discussion  is my contribution as an attempt to see 
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Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological position in a fresh light. I understand that 
Merleau-Ponty’s aim was almost equally ambitious as was the aim of the traditional 
epistemological theories. Merleau-Ponty’s saw problems in the traditional theories. 
He was able to describe them very thoroughly, but in the end he did not achieve to 
provide as good solution to the problems faced by the traditional theories as he had 
hoped for. Matthews concludes his book by saying that Merleau-Ponty was defeated 
in his attempt to unify well enough the spheres of extreme objectivism and the 
extreme subjectivism9. Merleau-Ponty could not solve the problem of objectivism. I 
will attempt to take this discussion, this aim a step closer to its goal by seeing the 
discussion at new in the light of the Contemporary visual arts. The problem will be 
revealed to the reader a step by step throughout this essay.       
I conclude for now that Merleau-Ponty is a philosopher who acknowledges the 
course of history, but he is also very clearly to be understood as an advocate of the 
thought that we persons live here and now, and that we have intentions about our 
future. All of these different aspects of time, - past, present, and future, - play an 
important part in his way of thinking. Merleau-Ponty was very involved in including 
the then prevailing directions of arts, politics, etc. in his phenomenological position. 
But he was also very aware of the difficulties of including the prevailing theoretical 
ideas and practical approaches, because the prevailing ideas were basically too fresh, 
not available yet in the history books as organized, discussed and analyzed resource.10  
Thus, the two parallel aspects of the traditional theories and the sphere of the 
Modern arts are with Merleau-Ponty all the way from the start to finish. I wish to 
continue along the lines sketched by Merleau-Ponty, understood that I will also 
include the historically strong position of the traditional epistemological view, - 
which is no less present in the present day course of thought, - as the analytical 
parallel, as well as I see the potentiality of crossing the spheres of Merleau-Ponty’s 
                                                
9 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. xxii. 
10 I limit my self to the scope of the Modern visual arts, while Merleau-Ponty himself includes 
different branches of the Modern arts to the discussion, such as poetry (ref. Rimbaud) and certain 
literature styles (ref. Kafka), in addition to others. Merleau-Ponty writes: “It has often been said that 
modern artists and thinkers are difficult. Picasso is harder to understand, indeed to love, than Poussin 
or Chardin; the same is said of Giraudoux or Malraux, as opposed to Marivaux or Stendhal. Some, such 
as Julien Benda, have even drawn the conclusion that modern writers are ‘byzantine’, are difficult 
simply because they have nothing to say and peddle subtlety in place of art. Nothing could be further 
from the truth. If Modern though is difficult and runs counter to common sense, this is because it is 
concerned with the truth; experience no longer allows to settle for the clear and straightforward notions 
which common sense cherishes because they bring peace of mind.” (Merleau-Ponty, The World of 
Perception, p.37.) 
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phenomenology and the Contemporary arts.  I will replace the Modern arts of the 
times of Merleau-Ponty with the present day Contemporary site-specific and 
situational visual art projects. 
In order to building a comfortable way towards taking up and discussing more in 
detail the guiding question of what do we see, it is important to say a few words how 
to read Merleau-Ponty. I keep remaining that this  
question will eventually take the reader in hand and lead him or her through this 
essay by exposing the reader to a number of perspective ways of addressing and 
looking at the different issues of the underlying big question of this essay. 
 
2.2 How to read and understand Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of 
Perception 
So, at this point, I assume that it will be helpful to say a few words about the 
structure and method of Merleau-Ponty’s writings based on describing. This is 
essential so that the reader can understand how to follow Merleau-Ponty’s way of 
thinking11, and also, how to have a key to understand my writings. 
The challenge of reading Merleau-Ponty is that he does not put forward his 
thinking process in a linear and analytical manner. Recall the remark from the 
previous section, that Merleau-Ponty does not explicit put forward a clear main 
question as a guiding light for the reader. He simply and plainly starts describing his 
interest and concern, while continually inviting the parallels of the empirical and 
intellectual courses in the Cartesian tradition into the discussion. It is left to the reader 
to grasp and form a question out of Merleau-Ponty’s material. The question, which I 
take to be the driving force motivating Merleau-Ponty in his work, is namely my 
rephrased version of the old epistemological question which I put forward in the very 
beginning of this essay. This is a question which I have extracted out of Merleau-
Ponty’s material based on my understanding of this material.  
Merleau-Ponty does not lead the reader through his thought process by 
analytically discussing an issue by an issue based on clear logical order and causality. 
This is not the method of phenomenology. But Merleau-Ponty does manage to attack 
very strongly the very foundations of the traditional theories of empiricism and 
intellectualism. That of attacking the foundations of the traditional theories and 
                                                
11 Matthews, Merleau-Ponty A Guide for the Perplexed, “‘a manner or style of thinking’”, p. 13. 
 22 
describing his own position, are not to be mixed up. Also, very importantly, I do 
discuss the practical sphere, but that of describing this sphere is not the same as 
thinking along the lines of the established conventions accepted by the general 
common sense.  
Here, in this section, the reader will get the first very concrete key how to 
understand the method of describing. It is difficult to grasp the core of Merleau-
Ponty’s writings because of his method of describing which is close to being an “anti-
analytical” approach. The method of phenomenology is rather to look at the same 
issue from slightly different points of the view. This reveals new relations between 
the already mentioned and familiar issues. - Therefore, I draw a parallel between 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological method and Cézanne’s paintings12. Merleau-
Ponty discusses himself explicit the painting of Cézanne in his text. But he does not 
compare his own style of writing to Cézanne’s style of painting, although he does 
draw parallels between his philosophical way of thinking and the structure and 
meaning of Cézanne’s paintings. The likeness between Merleau-Ponty’s writing style 
towards building up his view, and Cézanne’s painting style revealing his view, is a 
similarity which I find, or I rather draw out of Merleau-Ponty’s way of putting 
forward his material. Thus, metaphorically, Merleau-Ponty can be understood as 
building his text like a viewer slowly would discover the world of Cézanne’s 
paintings13. For example, look a painting by Cezanne where he puts forward his view 
of the simple elements such as apples, a bowl, a glass, a knife and a cloth on a table. 
The relations of the objects to each other in these slightly shifted and altered ways of 
expressing the reality as seen by Cézanne is of essence. In one way we understand 
that the painting does not represent reality in its objective and expected way. In the 
analytical sense it is to be understood that the painting is wrongly constructed as a 
representative of the reality of the world. The perspectives are not representative of 
the reality. They are perspectives, which are impossible to be seen from one single 
standpoint alone in the reality, although they seem to be in a harmony in Cézanne’s 
painting. A careful and patient viewer will discover that the painting in its own world 
                                                
12 Other Modern painters of significance for Merleau-Ponty are: Juan gris, Braque and Picasso 
(Merleau-Ponty, The World of Perception, p. 69). I could have equally compared Merleau-Ponty for 
any one of these painters. For the sake of the clarity, I have decided to limit myself to the more detailed 
discussion on Cézanne. In addition, it is important to take notice that Merleau-Ponty is not interested in 
the abstract Modern painting as a link to his phenomenology. it is of importance that the painting show 
us objects and situations which are recognizable in their relation to the reality. 
13 Cezanne’s painting from ca. 1879.  
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is “right”. The painting is interesting and pleasant to look at. There is carefully chosen 
relations between the objects, the objects are organized in space, in depth in relation 
to each other, while the painting initially looks quite flat. Slowly, multiple layers of 
information are revealed to a viewer, if one looks at the painting for long enough. It 
takes time to move the gaze from perspective to perspective and to learn to appreciate 
them in this world of their own, in the framework of the painting. The issue of context 
is to be noticed, and how familiar objects are expressed at fresh to us. Cézanne’s 
paintings show the artist’s inner expressions of the pictured in a sense that his 
paintings were not objectively true to the colors and perspectives of the exterior world 
as viewed based on the scientific view. His expression on the canvas distorted the 
common sense based perceived reality by adding his very own personal interpretation 
of the expressed in terms of the non-imitating colors of the real. As Matthews 
explains, “in modern art, perspective is often ignored, things have blurred outlines and 
colors that differ from ‘what they should be’, and the shapes and arrangements of 
things may seem to us to be distorted.”14  
Further, the painting expresses Cézanne’s personal experience of the world to the 
larger community of viewers. Simply, this is Cézanne’s way of communicating with 
others. This is his way of showing his understanding of the world, in which we live, to 
others in this world. Merleau-Ponty does not mention the above painting by Cézanne, 
which I have chosen to discuss here. But Merleau-Ponty himself refers to a landscape 
painted by Cézanne, without giving the name or the year of the painting. In this 
context Merleau-Ponty says the following about many painters since Cézanne: 
 
“Thus different areas of their paintings are seen from different points of view. The 
lazy viewer will see “errors of perspective” here, while those who look closely will get 
the feel of a world in which no two objects are seen simultaneously, a world in which 
regions of space are separated by the time it takes to move our gaze from one to another, 
a world in which being is not given but rather emerges over time. Thus space is no longer 
a medium of simultaneous object capable of being apprehended by an absolute observer 
who is equally close to them all, a medium without point of view, without body and 
spatial position - in sum, the medium of pure intellect. As Jean Paulhan remarked 
recently, the space of Modern painting is ‘space which the heart feels’, space in which we 
                                                
14 Matthews, Merleau-Ponty, A Guide for the Perplexed, p. 136. 
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too are located, space which is close to us and with which we are organically 
connected.”15 
 
In his text, Merleau-Ponty applies a layer by layer method, adding a perspective 
after a perspective, therefore also expressing and lighting up a depth after a depth of 
his view. A relation after a relation is revealed. This relationality is of great 
importance and adds a great complexity to the issues under the investigation. Little by 
little, Merleau-Ponty’s text takes shape and shows and reflects a structure and a 
meaning. Now, pay attention, I just touched an issue, namely that of meaning being 
inseparable from its context, which will be of a great essence in this essay, in the 
coming chapters and sections. That the meaning cannot be seen or grasped without 
acknowledging its setting, and the relations between the objects, has a great relevance 
to the already mentioned position of transitoriness consisting of its location in us 
persons, and in the process of learning. Based on the view sketch by Merleau-Ponty, I 
take this issue of meaning being inseparable from its context to have an essential 
relation to that what we see. Remember, that the question which will guide the reader 
throughout this essay is the question of what do we see. 
Now, I would like to ask you to do something. - But before I will ask you to do 
that something, I will sketch a few assumptions about the situation in which you are 
finding yourself at the moment, as well as I will need to give you some instructions 
concerning the coming action.  First of all, I assume that you are seated at the 
moment. And please, stay seated, do not change your position, just keep reading as 
you have been doing. The first instruction is that, when I will ask you to do that 
coming something, just raise your head straight ahead, but do not turn your head to 
the either side, just sort of freeze your head in a fixed, upraised position for a minute 
or so, and let your gaze to wonder. The second instruction will encourage you, when 
engaged in that action, to take in impressions about anything your gaze will be able to 
get hold on. Maybe you will view something particular very close to you, as well as 
you will catch a view of something in a distance. Maybe there is a window or two 
within the reach of your gaze so that you could get a glance of something beyond the 
room. Through the third instruction I will ask you simply to enjoy the composition 
revealed in front of your eyes. I will encourage you just simply to look and to accept 
                                                
15 Merleau-Ponty, The World of Perception, p. 41. 
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the view without being critical about it. I will ask you to be critical later, so leave that 
action of mind for later. The fourth and the last instruction says, when finally asked, 
take your time, and let your gaze to wonder preferably closer to a minute, before 
returning back to reading. - Now, please, according to the instructions, do the 
following: Raise your head up and let your gaze to wonder for about a minute.  
 
Thank you for gazing up.  
- I assume that now the reader would like to get an explanation concerning the 
purpose and the relevance of the above experiment. Let me try to explain. I find a 
great relevance and a link between the above example, - which is mine, - and the 
painting structure applied by Cezanne, and Merleau-Ponty’s writing approach and 
method. I believe that the method of painting used by Cézanne can be compared and 
paralleled with that of sitting on a chair, having a view in front of one’s eyes. I believe 
that it is difficult to say that there is only one subjective perspective in front of one’s 
eyes. One is in somewhat fixed position, but the gaze travels from something seen in 
the distance to something seen closer. The head is still, but the gaze travels and keeps 
traveling and discovering different depths and aspects of the view in front. The view 
is composed of different perspectives, and different depths. The view revealed in front 
of one’s eyes is not based on a single frozen and fixed perspective.  
If one would look at a Classical painting, the copied reality imitated and 
presented, would in a way take one’s hand and lead one through the painting, with the 
help of the central perspective. In the classical painting the placement and the 
impression of each object seems to be carefully calculated and measured based on the 
mathematical principles. The information what the painting conveys is clear, precise, 
and determinate. The presented stays true to the colors seen in the reality. Also, the 
sizes and the appearances of the objects in their relations to each other are represented 
in these paintings as they are understood in the reality. The chosen frozen perspective 
comfortably and systematically leads one into the picture’s indefinite focus point, into 
the objective eternality, into the deep infinitive depth of the painting’s perspective 
without loosing one along the way. The dogmatic way would be paved and presented 
clearly to the observer, without giving alternatives to be considered. The presented 
impression is that nothing could be taken away, and nothing could be added to these 
masterpieces of the Classical era. The Classical way of painting is a certain kind of a 
scientific way of compromising and representing the external world objectively, as 
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true to its color and appearance. The subjective position of the painter is not present. 
Also, there is a distance between the viewer and the painting the viewer is looking at. 
Thus, there is distance between the subject and the object under the investigation. The 
situation is characterized as passive. With the other words, the Classical painting 
keeps the viewer in a distance.16  
Well, this is not the way to go for Merleau-Ponty. For Merleau-Ponty, there are 
many alternatives to be considered, and the road is not clear or determinate in 
advance. Merleau-Ponty is after to establish that what we see, is not the calculated and 
objective world view as a chosen compromised perspective view acting in accordance 
with the causal and law like principles of science. In contrast, according to Merleau-
Ponty, there are multiple perspectives and multiple depths, and therefore also multiple 
relations, for us to ponder over. In the initial phrase, his text is to be understood as a 
vague and proximate composition within a large frame. A chapter after a chapter, this 
composition starts forming a clearer and a clearer appearance through further 
discussions concerning the different elements viewed from different perspectives in 
new relations within this frame. There are layers and layers of information which 
cannot be discussed once and for all, and then put on the side and not mentioned 
again. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach might seem like a self-repeating 
system, but it is not. The phenomenological method of describing and viewing the 
issues from only slightly different angles is not be understood as unnecessary 
repetition, but rather as adding another angle and a relation to the issue and therefore 
also adding another depth to the issue. Merleau-Ponty does not see anything in 
isolation. Isolation within the world is impossible for him. That what we see is seen in 
a relation to something else. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is to be understood as 
it is build, not from foundations in a traditional sense, but as like Cezanne’s painting 
revealing information gradually. Merleau-Ponty’s text is to be discovered by reading 
a word by a word, a page after a page. As a result of this writing method, Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophical view is not easily reached and grasped by the reader. Although, 
it can be said, that his writing method reflects his phenomenological position. This 
way understood Merleau-Ponty is very consequent. Slowly, over time, the reader, will 
arrive closer to a whole which reveals a great intensity and complexity when 
appreciated correctly. It is to be recognized that through his layered and perspectivist 
                                                
16 Merleau-Ponty, The World of Perception, p. 40. 
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approach Merleau-Ponty slowly builds up towards a peculiar kind of a holistic 
phenomenological position. This is an important fact to kept in mind when reading 
my paper, although, I will try to put the issues forward as logically and as much as 
possible in a step by step approach, in order to lead the reader through the text in a 
coherent and logical manner. Now, recall the aspect of the practical sphere and reflect 
over the following: Merleau-Ponty is interested in describing the everyday situations, 
not analyzing them by reason. The point is to describe that what we see, and not 
analytically explain how that what we see is to be constructed. 
 
 
 
 28 
 
 
 
 
Part 2 - Contrasting the Case 
 29 
Part 2 - Contrasting the Case 
 
 
Chapter 3 - The historical background with the focus in 
the subject-object relation. 
 
3.1 The purpose of contrasting the case 
In an attempt to describe and explain what I mean by the already said, I need to 
further contrast my view with something that the majority of the philosophers in the 
Western philosophical tradition feel comfortable with. Since the big underlying 
question deals with knowledge, I’ll present and contrast, my view in the background 
of the well established and well known theories of empiricism and intellectualism 
dealing with the question of knowledge. That of taking up the traditional 
epistemological question dealing with certain knowledge, together with the 
phenomenological approach, highlights the differences between these courses. This 
makes it easier for the reader to understand why Merleau-Ponty sees a need to revise 
the question when it has to do with us persons and not alone by the scientific 
knowledge. This parallel approach will serve as a clarifying element in order to grasp 
why the traditional theories are flawed, as understood by Merleau-Ponty. This serves 
as a ground why Merleau-Ponty sees a need for putting forward his phenomenology 
of perception as an alternative for empiricism and intellectualism. I believe that by 
this approach the reader will get a better understanding of both of these positions. 
 
3.2 Returning to the issues of the theoretical and the practical spheres  
Now, it is at its place to have a more detailed discussion of the empiricism and the 
intellectualism in the Cartesian tradition. Now I am returning to the beginning of this 
essay. - I keep reminding the reader, that by now slightly different perspectives and 
depths have been added to the ongoing discussion in this essay. This is to be 
understood, that the material in the coming sections and chapters will be constantly 
seen and understood from a wider and more complex perspective, and therefore also 
understood differently than initially. - Remember that this is the method used 
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Merleau-Ponty, as well as this is the technique used by me in this essay. So don’t take 
it as an unnecessary repetition that I return to the same issues, a time after a time, each 
time seen from to some extent more saturated position. This is a way of forming a 
holistic position, establishing a common ground for further reflection and for 
exchanging ideas, while not loosing our personal involvement. With the other words, 
this way I keep the objective and the reflective, stepping-on-the-side-gaze with me, 
while I simultaneously hold onto and accept my subjectivity in this world as an 
individual, as well as I aim to communicate with others. 
Thus, let’s return to the issues of the theoretical and the practical spheres from a 
perspective of an added complexity. As known traditionally, epistemology has been 
dealing with the question of certain truth(s), and how to arrive or establish something 
as certain and true. Remember, that I pull out from the lengthy introductory section of 
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, that in its very root, that of gaining 
knowledge, has to do with the subject-object relation. - The very problem of the 
traditional theories is that there is a distance between the perceiver and that of 
perceiving the world. Another way of seeing this is that we have forgotten what it is 
to live in the world. We have gone straight to that of theorizing while ignoring our 
very roots in this world.  
The difficult thing to accept about Merleau-Ponty is that he insists that before we 
can start talking about that of gaining knowledge, we need to establish what it is to 
live in the world. According to Merleau-Ponty, the traditional theories base that of 
gaining certain knowledge on theorizing. This needs to be discussed according to 
Merleau-Ponty. It is of great essence to keep in mind that the important difference 
between the traditional theories and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is that Merleau-
Ponty is not primarily interested of that of gaining knowledge, he is interested in 
describing how we exists in the world, and how we only through this can have access 
to knowledge. If put in Matthews’ words, this is expressed in a following manner: 
 
“Merleau-Ponty, however, is not primarily concerned with our relation to the world 
as knowers, that is, with our cognitive relation to thing. Cognitive relations to objects are 
themselves dependent on a more primitive kind of involvement with them, which must be 
described before we can understand the meaning which more abstract concepts possess. 
Before we can know what things are in the world, and what characteristics and relations
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to other things those things have, we must first be involved with things as a much more 
basic level. Living in the world comes first, knowing about it comes later.”17 
 
In order to understand and accept the above summary by Matthews, it is important 
to look into more detailed criticism of the traditional theories of empiricism and 
intellectualism given by Merleau-Ponty. So, what does Merleau-Ponty aim to show 
here? He aims to show that the traditional theories of empiricism and intellectualism 
are halting when concerning the subject-object relation, that of subjectivism and 
objectivism; one representing extreme subjectivism and the other representing 
extreme objectivism, if taken in their polarized ends. Merleau-Ponty utilizes these 
very extreme positions in order to further color and emphasize his phenomenological 
aim. This is what I call contrasting the case. - Merleau-Ponty himself has said that 
“probably the chief gain from [his] phenomenology is to have united extreme 
subjectivism [empiricism] and extreme objectivism [intellectualism] in its notion of 
the world or of rationality”18. Keep this phenomenological aim in mind. I will return 
in more detail into this particular claim in my conclusion. But before it is possible to 
view this aim from the desired perspective and depth, it is important to include the 
issues provided by the historical aspects as an added angle and insight for the coming 
discussion in Part 3.  
 
3.3 What do we see as contrasted with, what do we ought to see 
The fundaments of the empiricism and the intellectualism in Cartesian tradition 
are very different, empiricism taking the sense experience to be the origin behind all 
knowledge and intellectualism relaying on mind based rational thought while viewing 
the sense experience to be of secondary value. Although these traditional courses are 
based on fundaments very distinct and broadly taken nearly opposing from each other, 
they have in common that their main concern is on what we ought to see, instead of 
focusing on that what we see.19 For Merleau-Ponty, the difference between that of 
what we ought to see and what we see is of utmost, essential importance. This attitude 
of what we ought to see implies that the world is taken in its objective sense and 
                                                
17 Matthews, Merleau-Ponty, A Guide for the Perplexed, p. 22. 
18 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. xxii. 
19 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 33. 
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viewed as something precise and entirely determined. “The world is posited in the 
first place”20. The world functions as a reference. The standard is set by the objective 
world and not by the person viewing the world within the empirical or the intellectual 
courses. Both of these traditional theories, despite of being built on distinct 
fundaments, are analytical in a sense that they aim to see objectively. To this attitude 
of what we ought to see objectively, Merleau-Ponty refers to as to that of analytical 
perception. Another way of expressing this is, in Merleau-Ponty’s terms, is to say that 
analytical perception aims to see what we ought to see while the objective world sets 
the standard of measure, and not the person who is observing. Thus, the person, 
engaged within these two traditional courses, does not have the central or originating 
reference point for that of perceiving.  This implies that there is a distance between an 
empiricist and the way he treats perception, and the same applies for an intellectualist, 
there as well is a distance between an intellectualist and the way he treats 
perception.21 Merleau-Ponty aims to turn the focus to that what we see instead of that 
what we ought to see objectively and determinately. The subject-object relation is in 
the core of that what we see as contrasted with, what we ought to see. 
Putting the focus on that what we see includes a shift of the positions. The world 
will not be put on the first place. Instead, it will be the person who through his own 
body will be put in the first place within the world. 
As a whole, Merleau-Ponty’s aim is to put forward his own theory of perception 
in the light of his phenomenology that will provide an alternative for overcoming the 
epistemological problems faced within perception by both empiricism and 
intellectualism in the Cartesian tradition. Merleau-Ponty’s aim within his introduction 
is to discuss in detail how these traditional theories are flawed in their argumentations 
concerning the search for knowledge. A one way of expressing this is, according to 
Merleau-Ponty, that the rational standpoint is characterized as if one always knows 
what one is looking for. This could also be expressed by asking, what is the point of 
looking for something if one already knows in advance what one is looking for. If one 
would know what one is looking for, he should not be searching. Or, on the other 
hand, if one would realize that the empiricist’s failure is that he misses the point that 
one needs to know that one is looking for something, otherwise one should not be 
                                                
20 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 36. 
21 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 30. 
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searching.22 Merleau-Ponty is very much aware of that these traditional, well-
established theories are strong and thorough in their argumentations. Therefore, it is 
crucial for Merleau-Ponty to go into a detailed and many-sided dialogue with the 
empiricists and the intellectuals so that he will be able to discuss the flaws and 
strengths of both of these traditional theories in their search for knowledge. According 
to Merleau-Ponty, their biggest flaw follows as a result of forgetting to pay attention 
to our practical everyday life which seems to be taken granted by these theories. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, we can search access to knowledge by studying our 
everyday life, and how we are situated in these daily events of our practical life. 
Therefore the underlying suggestion is that the study of us persons will lead us 
towards grasping how to gain access to knowledge bringing events.  
 
Merleau-Ponty’s intention is to establish a ground, or call it a framework, within 
what we persons can start the search for knowledge. Merleau-Ponty believes that it is 
through our bodily existence in the lived world that will give us access to knowledge. 
This is what Merleau-Ponty is after to establish. But keep in mind that Merleau-Ponty 
is not after to establish a purely subjective view, nor a purely objective view or a view 
based on any kind of a causal rules. 
So, how are we to be understanding Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology dealing 
with the questions of person’s lived everyday life before it takes up the question 
concerning the search for knowledge? One way of understanding Merleau-Ponty’s 
approach is that he is taking a step back, to the moments preceding the actual search 
for knowledge. But why? Why not to continue that of searching for certain knowledge 
as the traditional theories have done ever since the times of Plato in the Western 
philosophical tradition? Why is Merleau-Ponty skeptical to this tradition? Why does 
he not follow this analytical tradition? - Hasn’t this epistemological concern how to 
gain certain knowledge been raised, answered, and appreciated, by both the traditional 
empirical and intellectual courses, throughout the Western philosophical history ever 
since the Ancient times of Greece? - Didn’t Aristotle establish the theory of the 
natural world meaning that all of our knowledge has its roots in, as well as is lead 
from, our sense experiences? Didn’t Descartes closer to 2000 years later in his Six 
Meditations published in 1641 refuse the empirically founded Aristotelian view of 
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gaining certain knowledge, and re-estate the role of senses as secondary to the 
unquestionable epistemological truths arrived by the rational thought based on the 
rule of clear and distinct perception? How about Kant, as a rationalist in Cartesian 
tradition aiming to structure the sense-experience, building on Hume’s empiricism 
based on habituality, only 40 years after the first publication of Descartes’ Six 
Meditations in his Critique of Pure Reason in 1781 put forward his Copernican 
revolution claiming that it is impossible for us persons to know anything about the 
world independent of human experience. However, Kant did not reject the prevailing 
scientific ideal of aiming to see the objective and universal truth which clearly implies 
that although Kant realized the importance of the person in the center, he still kept the 
objective world as the reference point along the rational Cartesian thought.  - So, 
hasn’t the question of senses been discussed and emptied from all of its potential 
mysteries throughout the history, by both the empiristically and intellectually based 
philosophical theories? 
Now, let’s return to the helping question of this essay, and further, why to ask this 
particular question. - As you remember, throughout the essay, this question will be 
taken up and discussed from the different perspectives, in different context, which all 
together form a larger whole, entity. - So, why to ask the question of what do we see? 
What does that of seeing have to do with the position, life and meaning of a person in 
the world? - First of all, isn’t that of seeing based on one of the five senses known as 
sense experiences of seeing, hearing, smelling, touching and tasting? And after this 
has been said, isn’t it natural to think, based on the reasoning of the traditional 
epistemological theorizing, that the position, the life and the meaning of us persons in 
the world should not be described in terms of seeing, or any other sense experiences if 
the aim is to establish something certain and indubitable? Since isn’t it natural to 
doubt the reliability and value of the human sense of seeing based on the strong and 
predominant scientific and mathematical view that the knowledge achieved by sense 
experiences, - including that of seeing -, is to be rated as secondary to the knowledge 
established by intellect?  
 - Thus, ever since the times of Plato in Western analytical philosophy the 
objectivity and the rational thought based on pure and impersonal reason has hold the 
highest and the most true and the optimal value. But no, this objectivity is not the way 
to go for Merleau-Ponty, - as already indicated in comparison to the Classical 
painting. According to Merleau-Ponty, the traditional theories seem to have forgotten 
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the importance of the basic everyday life in which we persons, through our bodies in 
direct experience with the world, are engaged throughout our lives. The direct contact 
with our everyday lives is the key to understand that of being a person, according to 
Merleau-Ponty. A direct experience with the world in which we life has to do with 
our sense experience, such as seeing. Simply, the human perspective as a basis for all 
reflection and theorizing as a initial condition taking place in our daily lives is needed 
here. And this leads to the reopening of the question concerning the role of senses. 23 
 
3.4 Reopening the problem of sense experience 
Thus, the intention of Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of these traditional theories, is to 
be taken as reopening the problem of sense experience. Merleau-Ponty puts the focus 
once again to the questions as what is it to see, to hear, to fell, to sense something; 
what is it to have a sense experience?24 Merleau-Ponty is asking in his introduction, 
what role does the sense experience play in our everyday lived lives and in the search 
for access to knowledge. The role of sense experience is to be followed like a guiding, 
underlying red line going through the different perspectives discussed in this essay, 
and in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception as in this essay. However, - I 
am taking into discussion only a limited aspect of this. This limited aspect, which is of 
my interest, is the essence of the visual experience. Another important layer added to 
the discussion is that of describing the structure of consciousness and the structure of 
that of perceived based on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of perception while 
limited to that of seeing.  
The basic idea behind this pre-objective and pre-reflected position is that it’s 
through our bodies that we temporarily exist in the world. This claim inevitably leads 
to that of re-establishing the role of senses after Descartes. The value of the uncertain 
and undecided will be recognized as having the initial key value for our existence and 
therefore also for our access to knowledge. This pre-objective position, which we can 
access by describing our daily lives, points towards a subjective sphere of experience. 
Bodily awareness is subjective and individual. The subjective and the objective have 
been traditionally viewed as two separate spheres. Merleau-Ponty is after to unify 
these previously clearly distinguished spheres of subjectivism and objectivism. 
According to him, the subject and the object relation should not be understood as two 
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separate positions, but as intertwined. But why is it important to achieve the subject 
object relationship as intertwined? - Because through this we can grasp that the 
meaning is inseparable from the context. Merleau-Ponty is very much aware that we 
are conscious beings. As he himself states that “ all consciousness is consciousness of 
something”25. That the seen has a structure and that the structure, or the arrangement 
of the elements, carries a meaning which is intertwined with the structure of our 
perceptual consciousness. Further, in the structure of the perceptual consciousness 
learning plays a crucial role.  
 Merleau-Ponty sees that parallel to the structure of the seen and the structure of 
the perceptual consciousness, us as persons are to be understood together with our 
actions. He claims that the meaning of a person is inseparable from the actions he or 
she under goes. He is after that we need to understand us persons in order to 
understand how to have access to “a ‘knowledge-bringing event’”26. In this event 
learning plays a key role. His phenomenological approach will give us a true access to 
knowledge about ourselves and about the world in which we live. Merleau-Ponty 
encourages us to see the value in something what is not yet determinate and clear, 
where there is room for development and learning. The point of this is that we will get 
a deeper understanding of us persons and of our nature. Through this we will better 
grasp what it is to be a person, as well as how do we gain knowledge after having 
access to this “‘knowledge-bringing event’”27. The fundamental and the most 
important function of perception is, according to Merleau-Ponty, to lay the 
foundations for all of our knowledge from mathematical and geometrical truths to that 
of feeling pleasure and pain.28  
Merleau-Ponty takes this bodily existence to refer to the sense experience 
basically saying that “sense experience is that vital communication with the world 
which makes it present as a familiar setting of our life”29. But what does Merleau-
Ponty mean by the above statement? - Well, it can be understood that to Merleau-
Ponty perception creates, and even more so establishes the initial and the vital 
condition as “the background from which all acts stand out”30. Merleau-Ponty’s 
                                                
25 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. xix. 
26 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 35. 
27 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 35. 
28 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 19. 
29 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 61. 
30 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. xi. 
 37 
phenomenology of perception stands for that of investigating the nature of a person’s 
bodily existence. The position that Merleau-Ponty takes can in its ultimate intention 
be understood in a following way: Merleau-Ponty is supreme of its kind as an 
opponent of Cartesian rationalism and absolutist thought. Merleau-Ponty’s 
Phenomenology of Perception has the aim of doing exactly the same as Descartes did 
in his time to then prevailing Aristotelian theory of the natural world through his Six 
Meditations. Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s aim is to undermine the Cartesian based 
intellectualism and empiricism as solid and certain sources of true knowledge. - Let’s 
review in short what Descartes did in his time, before going any further. What did 
Descartes do? In his time, Descartes’ aim was to replace the then prevailing 
Aristotelian thought that all of our knowledge has its roots in and is lead from our 
sense experiences. Descartes method of questioning the prevailing Aristotelian theory 
was to involve the reader in a skeptical argument without ever directly mentioning the 
predominating Aristotelian thought. Descartes’ skeptical argument was presented in a 
form of six meditations. In these six meditations Descartes invited the reader to 
meditate, to follow his theoretic thought experiment with Descartes himself, and 
finally to conclude in his new metaphysical foundations as a foundation for 
knowledge. Descartes intention for anyone participating in this metaphysical, 
skeptical argument was to find some certainty in something. Descartes believed that if 
he could establish one certain truth, this would eventually lead to the discovery of 
further truths, therefore rebuilding a new, solid and lasting foundation for knowledge. 
Descartes believed that all knowledge has its foundation in the metaphysical truth(s). 
If we cannot establish some metaphysical truths and have a solid, indubitable 
metaphysical foundation, we cannot have epistemological truths either. The theory of 
knowledge rests on the first philosophy. Descartes analytical method and thought 
experiment found the first truth in the pure, only intellectually accessible cogito-
argument by using the clear and distinct perception as a guiding and proof giving rule 
in this search while turning away and leaving behind the body-based senses as 
doubtful sources of knowledge. Thus, after reconstructing the foundations of 
knowledge based on the first and principle truth of the rational thought, as a final 
touch Descartes reevaluated the role of senses as a secondary to the rational thought, - 
functioning in an union of the mind and body.31 Descartes claimed that the role and 
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function of senses was correctional taking care of body’s well being, - a desired and 
necessary function which again was guaranteed by God. - And now, Merleau-Ponty is 
asking us once more, as did Descartes do in his time, to reevaluate the role of senses 
in knowledge. Merleau-Ponty is questioning both the traditional empiricism and 
intellectualism (rationalism) resting on the Cartesian dualistic tradition after 
Descartes.   
In principle, I take that Merleau-Ponty’s approach is that of going straight to the 
foundations of these traditional theories by criticizing the very foundations and 
therefore the nature of these theories, - without getting last in details and further 
explanations -, by questioning the origins and therefore the solidity and certainty of 
these foundations. This approach is exactly the same as that of Descartes in his Six 
Meditations. The difference is just that Descartes used doubt as an inviting and 
effective tool to draw the reader to go through a meditation in solitude, while 
Merleau-Ponty uses a dialectic approach throughout his investigation as an equally 
attractive and powerful tool. - Well, history seems to repeat itself when Merleau-
Ponty sets to re-evaluate the role of sense once again by going to the roots of the well-
established theories of empiricism and intellectualism. By doing this Merleau-Ponty 
reopens the question of senses once more, as did Descartes after Aristotle. Thus, the 
role of senses in a relation to knowledge is one of the red lines going through and to 
be followed in Merleau-Ponty’s dialogue with the empiricists and intellectualists. 
Merleau-Ponty’s aim of undermining the traditional theories of empiricism and 
intellectualism is accomplished by describing the structure of perception according to 
each of these traditional theories. The structure of perception is to be taken as 
including both the structure of a person’s consciousness and the structure of the seen. 
Further, according to Merleau-Ponty through the structure of the perception alone can 
we grasp what perception is.32 And through the structure of perception it is possible to 
describe the essence and nature of perception. 
 
 
                                                
32 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 4. 
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Chapter 4 - The World 
 
4.1 The person’s position in the world 
Now, recall from the beginning of this essay, my claim that I take it given that the 
world exists independent of us persons. This claim has its clear roots in Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty takes that the world is there already before 
this inquiry about the person’s’ origins starts. - Yet, it is through his phenomenology, 
as a study of a person’s bodily existence, that Merleau-Ponty describes the person’s 
position in the world. This is the initial starting position towards the first important 
step when following Merleau-Ponty’s set-up. For him, the world serves as a natural 
setting in which perception takes place as a “background from which all acts stand 
out”33. This can be further illustrated by Merleau-Ponty’s own words when he states 
that “the body is the vehicle of through which we are temporarily anchored in the 
world”34 
At this point it is important to discuss in detail that of the world in the first place. 
What does Merleau-Ponty mean by saying that the world is there already before this 
inquiry about the being’ origins starts? What is this discussion about the objective 
world and perception? This could be further illustrated by a following example:  
It is assumed that the physical world in its determinate sense is already there. The 
question is what is visual perception, or what does one see? Merleau-Ponty illustrates 
this with help of an example discussing that of seeing “a landscape on a misty day”35. 
One does not see the landscape clearly. The landscape is apparently perceived as 
disappearing gradually into the monotonous grayness, - although one knows, or one 
ought to see that the entire determinate and unmysterious landscape is there. Merleau-
Ponty agrees with empiricists and intellectualists that the world itself in its objective 
sense is determined, based on the analytical perception. However, at the moment, 
temporarily the landscape is perceived as indeterminate, unclear and vague. The more 
distant parts appear to vanish into the deep, thick grey mist and therefore being 
temporarily hidden for the viewer. And therefore, with the other words, as a result of 
the misty weather, these more distant parts of the world, are not visible at the 
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moment. Although, through the analytical perception with the help of paying attention 
and judging, one is able to conclude that objectively in its real sense the landscape is 
determinate and that the distant parts are there despite of the fact that momentarily 
one is not able to see these distant parts.  
How we perceive the world based on the natural perception varies, not only from 
day to day, but also from person to person. The natural perception is not a counter 
example or the opposite of the analytical perception, it is just different from the 
analytical perception. The natural perception is indeterminate in its nature, and 
therefore easily confusing. In this visual sense experience one perceives something. 
This perceived something is by its nature vague, undecided, uncertain, and undefined. 
Further, the perceived is shaped by its context and can be understood in more than 
one way. Here, again, now just from a slightly different perspective, the structure of 
the perceived as something contextual and equivocal in its meaning is recognizable. 
Recall the examples of Modern painting from the Part 1 and reflect over the above 
sentence in light of that example, as well as the example of the landscape in the misty 
weather. Also, the structure of consciousness, with an opening towards the process of 
learning, is recognizable in both of these examples. As Merleau-Ponty himself 
expresses this, “the perceived, by its nature, admits of the ambiguous, the shifting, 
and is shaped by its context”36. Further, he states that “[W]e must recognize the 
indeterminate as a positive phenomenon”, and that “[I]ts meaning is an equivocal 
meaning; we are concerned with an expressive value rather than with logical 
signification.“37  
Further, according to Merleau-Ponty, that of perceiving something is not the same 
as understanding something. The epistemological problem of visual perception arises 
when we perceive something else than what we objectively conclude with. The key 
issue here is that the meaning is not separable from the seen, and this is what “causes 
the problem of perception to reappear”38. 
The above landscape example also lights up, - again -, the method of 
phenomenology just from a slightly different angle in the light in this context. 
Phenomenology is based on the idea of describing the real rather than by constructing 
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or forming it39. Describing is not the same as explaining or understanding. Therefore, 
it follows that categorically, according to Merleau-Ponty, perception differs from 
judgements, acts, and predications.40 To him perception is that of seeing something, 
tasting something, hearing something, sensing something. - Within the visual 
experience, seeing something can provide us some knowledge about the world and its 
objects and about ourselves. It is possible to describe the real based on the natural 
perception, as well as it is possible to explain the real by analytical perception. The 
difference is that one perceives the real, and when one describes the real instead of 
analyzing the real, one will be faced with the possibility of variation within the 
results. Merleau-Ponty’s ‘notion of the rea1’ refers to the world. “The world is what 
we perceive”41, and everything what we perceive is perceived in the context of the 
world.  
Merleau-Ponty takes the objective world from the first place where it is positioned 
by the empiricists and intellectualists. Merleau-Ponty puts the focus on the person 
himself and his temporal bodily existence as the anchor through which the person 
exists and views the world. This is to be understood that the center and therefore the 
first place in located in us, in persons, and it is to follow the first place is not any 
longer given justifiably to the objective world. - However, as a matter of fact, there is 
nothing new about this position that a person is put in the center of the investigation. 
Now, recall again the issue of perspectivism, as discussed earlier in relation to Kant. 
Remember, Kant in his time rejected the prevailing metaphysics based on the idea 
that it is possible to gain knowledge about the world independent of human 
experience. Kant turned the focus to us, to a person in the center (the Copernican 
revolution). However, he did not reject the scientific ideal of aiming to see the 
objective and universal. This implies that although Kant realized the importance of 
the person in the center, he still kept the objective world as the reference point.  
Thus, Kant in his time insisted that it is impossible for us humans, us persons to 
know anything about the world independent of experience. Yet, Kant claimed that the 
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human experience taking place was dependent of certain pre-requisite conditions. 
Kant stated that these necessary conditions which must be fulfilled in order for us 
persons to be able to have any sense based experience and therefore the possibility of 
gaining knowledge. For Kant these necessary conditions were the 1) space and time, 
2) that of understanding referred to as the basic concepts in their respective categories, 
and 3) “the forms of reason”42. I take this to mean that nor is Kant is a clean-cut 
empiricist, neither a rationalist, instead of he is to be understood as a some kind of a 
hybrid of empiricism and intellectualism in a way. With the other words, Kant is a 
Rational empiricist in Cartesian tradition.  
Another way of putting this is to say that it can be understood that Kant is a 
representative of Rational empiricism in the Cartesian tradition by taking the 
empirical sense experience as the base of all knowledge, as the necessary requirement, 
while still holding on to the rationalistic thought aiming to see the world in the first 
place, as to give the ultimate value to the objective and universal way of seeing and 
understanding and appreciating the world, the exterior world, the “things-in-
themselves (Dinge an sich)”43 despite of that we never can view them that way. 
Kantian hold on to a thought that all one knows and all one sees, is through the filters 
of a person’s own colored view. More exactly, while one’s object of interest is the 
objective world, the exterior world as understood in its scientific sense meaning as it 
is “objectively and not as subjectively, individually understood, but as it is understood 
by everyone based on general, agreed rules and principles, knowledge found using 
methods based upon well-established facts and obeying well-established laws, 
thorough and accurate, describing and defining the real world, the exterior world 
which one never sees exactly as it is, but always through one’s personal filter. Kant 
had an important and crucial, a fundamental essence in that discovery, he just simply 
did not investigate it enough, according to Merleau-Ponty. 
It can be understood that Merleau-Ponty takes this hybrid-idea of Kant further and 
not only puts the human body in the center, but also recognizes that there is a value in 
that of seeing the world as we see it, not objectively, but subjectively, combining our 
“sense-experience-information-knowledge-bringing-initial-event” and that of 
reflecting over that pre-objective situation. “The body is not an object in the world, 
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but it is the subject’s own point of the view on the world”44. A person is characterized 
as a spatio-temporal person with access to ever changing perspectives, views of the 
world. It can be said that a person’s position in the world gives arise to Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenological position that describes how a person has access to and 
establishes knowledge of the world and of himself. For Merleau-Ponty, the primary, 
and the only “certain” is to found in us person.  
 
 
Chapter 5 - A dialogue with an empiricist  
 
5.1 Concerning the experience error 
Merleau-Ponty asks how to verify that what we perceive based on empiricism. 
Here, I will provide an example based on Merleau-Ponty’s own example45. My 
example is following: Think along the lines of the following example: One is walking 
along a track one has never before taken. The track passes through open landscape of 
rolling hills, corn fields, and woods of pine trees. The ground is partially sandy and 
covered by moss. The day is clear, and one is preoccupied with the music heard 
through one’s headphones, played by one’s iPod. One sees a brownish-grey wooden 
plank on the ground, and a few seconds later, one discovers even more of these planks 
of brownish-grey wood on the ground. Obviously these brownish-grey, wooden 
planks have been part of some kind of a construction. Some planks are by themselves, 
detached from the rest of the construction, some are still attached to others. Some sort 
of a force has been applied to these wooden elements of a construction so that they 
have come a part. One absorbs these visual impressions, and starts constructing an 
assumption, or several assumptions, in one’s mind. One has seen small huts and 
houses along the track one has walked. - Maybe these wooden pieces have been a hut 
that has seen better days? Or maybe the wooden planks have been part of something 
else? One has only past experiences and previous knowledge about the place to go 
after, or one’s imagination. One has no evidence, for what the wooden pieces have 
been used for. One is going slightly up hill, but one just cannot see over the hill yet. 
At the moment, when one has reached the point that one can see beyond the hill, one 
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sees a lake, and an old stranded, half destroyed brownish-grey wooden boat. It is still 
obvious that the object has been a rowboat although it is missing almost half of its 
other side and the front of the boat is badly demolished. - Merleau-Ponty’s point is 
that empiricism in its forming and verification of knowledge, is based on the single, 
atomic impressions, which are put together in one’s mind, and that this information 
gained by these single impressions can only be verified to be true or false afterwards, 
after a certain hypothesis is put forward. Impressions by themselves cannot be linked 
to other impressions. The linking of these single impression happens in one’s mind 
and is based on further impressions and previous experiences. This is arbitrary, 
according to Merleau-Ponty, and therefore cannot function as a basis for veridical 
knowledge. According to Merleau-Ponty, within empiricism, one can only reason 
backwards starting from the result, or the given discovery. One can reason that the 
single impressions together construct the given discovery. Call it a truth, a piece of 
knowledge. But one cannot take a single impression and link it directly to that piece 
of final information and knowledge. Neither can one lead final information or 
knowledge directly from the single impressions. The linking of these pieces of 
information is subjective, and happens in one’s mind. - If thought further along the 
given scenario, how about if one would have decided to turn around, right there and 
then, before reaching the point where one was able to see over the hill to the lake and 
to the demolished boat. How could one then have solved the puzzle of the brownish-
grey wooden planks found on the sandy, mossy ground among the pine trees? Would 
these single impressions, based on empiricism, then have been just some single 
impressions that one would have passed in one’s mind, not really bothering to reflect 
over what were they about?  
Let’s add another aspect to the above scenario. Take that the person in the above 
example was not walking alone. The person was walking together with a friend. The 
friend preferred directing his gaze towards the scenery on the left side of the track 
than on the right side of the track. He had forgotten to bring along his sunglasses and 
was therefore more comfortable facing towards left, turning away from the sun. 
Along the way he saw impressions of hay poles and tractors, cows and calves, while 
his friend wearing sunglasses and listening to his iPod saw old wooden huts and barns 
on the right side. Their experiences are different. Also, their hypothesis concerning 
the wooden blanks on the ground, on both sides of the track, are influenced by their 
previous impressions seen along the way, as well as by their past memories. The point 
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is that it is arbitrary which past influences one draws into the current problem-solving, 
there is no guarantee which of one’s past experiences the current is linked with. It is 
arbitrary which previous experience seems to be drawn into the solving of the 
scenario. The knowledge cannot be verified with the help of associations, past 
experiences and memories when this linking happens arbitrary in one’s mind. 
Associations and the reasoning can be applied afterwards, but this sort of paying 
attention has no power of solving that of perceived by itself. That of attention within 
empiricism only works as a searchlight in the darkness, revealing what is already 
there, in accordance with a scientific, intellectual method.46 Therefore, the basis for 
veridical knowledge which an empiricist puts forward is flawed according to 
Merleau-Ponty. 
 
5.2 Concerning ‘the constancy hypothesis’ and its principle structure 
Now, recall the role of the objective world within empiricism. The priority of the 
world ,- the misunderstood placing of the world in the first place, - can be explained 
by “‘the constancy hypothesis’”47, according to Merleau-Ponty. The idea of ‘the 
constancy hypothesis’ assumes that the world is put in the first place, and the world is 
seen in its objective and determinate sense. In principle, ‘the constancy hypothesis’ is 
based on the idea that one forms a point-to-point correspondence between that of 
perceived and the perceiver. For example, one sees a blue patch against a grey 
background. The problem arises when one realizes that one does not only see the blue 
patch on the foreground alone, but that the background is equally attached to the 
perceived. The points forming the edges of the blue patch and giving a shape to this 
blue patch equally correspond to the shape of the grey background. Merleau-Ponty’s 
point is that nothing is seen in isolation from its context. This is discussed and 
illustrated by the Gestalt psychology that claims that our perception is structured and 
cannot be simply translated by point-to-point perception in its direct relation to a local 
stimuli.  
This can be illustrated by a following example discussed by Merleau-Ponty48: One 
sees two horizontal lines against their background. See figure a). One perceives the 
lines to be of equal length. This information is constant and consistent with the 
                                                
46 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.30. 
47 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.8. 
48 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.6. 
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determinate objects of the objective world. The problem arises when auxiliary lines 
are added to this figure consisting of two parallel lines. If the auxiliary lines are added 
as in figure b), the addition of these auxiliary lines re-establishes the seen. It is widely 
accepted that the result is, that now one does view the objectively equal horizontal 
lines to appear as unequal, or simply different, according to their length. This 
perceived information is inconsistent with the fact that one knows that these two lines 
are of equal length as existing in the objective world. The important point which I 
want to emphasized here is that the structure of consciousness is discussed by 
Merleau-Ponty in a close relation to the structure of perception. A conflict in one’s 
perceptual consciousness concerning the reliability of the knowledge gained through 
the theory ‘the constancy hypothesis’ is apparent when the meaning of the original 
figure is redefined by the help of auxiliary lines. One can with the help of attention 
and judgement explain, that the horizontal lines objectively seen are of equal length, 
but the problem of perception rises when one sees something else than what one 
objectively knows. 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure a)      Figure b) 
Two horizontal lines of equal length. The Müller-Lyer’s optical 
illusion: Two horizontal lines of 
equal length with eight auxiliary  
lines.  
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The purpose of taking up the discussion of the Müller-Lyer’s illusion, is to further 
emphasize that both of the traditional theories of empiricism and intellectualism are 
incapable of answering the distinctive, but peculiar question of how does the 
perceptual consciousness constitute its objects in its relation to the structure of 
perception49. 
 
 
Chapter 6 - A dialogue with an intellectualist  
 
6.1 Concerning the attention and the judgement 
Thus, Merleau-Ponty describes that empiricism starts with the single impressions, 
and reasons backwards with the help of attention in order to find answers how to link 
the single impressions into something meaningful. After a long and detailed dialogue, 
seeing and discussing the foundations and method of clear and distinct perception, 
applied by an intellectualist, Merleau-Ponty describes the situation to be the reverse in 
case of the intellectualist. Merleau-Ponty shows that the intellectualist starts by 
applying the concept of attention. Merleau-Ponty discusses in detail the example of 
wax, which is analyzed and give an account by Descartes. According to Merleau-
Ponty, the intellectualist takes that if he just carefully enough pays attention, he will 
discover and be convinced that the wax consists of certain qualities such as hardness 
and solidity. The wax possesses these primary qualities. Through clear and distinct 
perception the intellectualist is able to reason and conclude on the qualities of the 
wax.  Further, if heat is applied to this solid and hard piece of wax, it will melt and 
turn soft and fluid. But still, to an intellectualist, he judges that the wax is still wax, 
just appearing in another form. Scientifically, the wax is still to be understood as wax. 
By paying attention and judging the intellectualist can objectively conclude that we 
still see wax. Well, this creates a problem for Merleau-Ponty. Remember, Merleau-
Ponty aims to distinguish between that what we naturally see and what we ought 
objectively to see. For Merleau-Ponty there is a difference in the appearance of the 
solid and hard piece of wax and the soft and fluid running wax. They are not the same 
for our gaze. Our eyes see them as different.  
                                                
49 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 30. 
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Further, if an intellectualist looks attentively enough at a die, a small cube marked 
with numbers, laying on a coffee table, straight from above, he will be able to 
conclude that he sees a geometrical form called a square in the die. Merleau-Ponty’s 
point is that the intellectualist will find the concept of a geometrical form known as a 
square in the die because his mind already possesses this concept. He will also find a 
geometrical form known as a circle in the CD Disk for the very same reason that the 
concept of a circle is already taken to be existing in his thoughts.50 These concepts 
just need to be called forward. These concepts are nothing new to an intellectualist, he 
is equipped by these concepts in advance. According to the principles of the pure 
intellect and the cogito-argument (I am thinking, therefore I exist) put forward by 
Descartes, the intellectualist’s mind is self-sufficient, all he needs to do is to apply the 
powers of attention in order to call forth these concepts. Merleau-Ponty describes that 
the external objects, which the intellectualist sees, become unnecessary for the 
determinate and all-possessing thought. The mind is complete and absolute, it has 
everything in its disposal in advance to the person’s actual and immediate experience 
with the exterior world.  
In contrast to empiricism, intellectualism ruled out subjectivity and therefore also 
eliminated the function of sense experience altogether by grounding everything on the 
foundation of objective, absolute and self-evident thought guided by attention and 
judgement. According to Merleau-Ponty, the intellectual view is based on a dogmatic 
idea of a being which possesses itself absolutely, originating from the powers of pure 
intellect after Descartes. 
But, Merleau-Ponty describes that the intellectual and the empirical doctrines have 
in common, that in both theories the power of attention is taken to be without 
function.51 It has become obsolete. Merleau-Ponty has described through his 
examples how the empirist’s single impressions, and the all possessing, self-sufficient 
and absolute intellectual though, are both independent of this mind based action of 
applying the powers of attention.52 
                                                
50 Merleau-Ponty used as example of a plate to illustrate this discussed here. Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology of Perception, p. 31. 
51 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 32. 
52 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 33. 
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Now it is time to recall the underlying very big question of this essay. Thus, what 
does the situationality, in terms of our bodily existence and our direct bodily contact 
with the world, have to do with that of having access to something that leads to 
knowledge about us persons and the exterior world. Now, we need to look at this 
question in a slightly saturated perspective of the said and done in this essay, in the 
new light of the discussion concerning the traditional theories. Recall also the 
argument from the section 3.3. saying that Merleau-Ponty’s aim within his 
introduction was to discuss in detail how the traditional theories of empiricism and 
intellectualism in the Cartesian tradition are flawed in their argumentations 
concerning the search for knowledge. A one way of expressing this was that the 
intellectual standpoint is characterized as if one always knows what one is looking 
for. This was also be expressed by asking, what is the point of looking for something 
if one already knows in advance what one is looking for. It was stated that if one 
knows what one is looking for, he should not be searching. Or, on the other hand, the 
empiricist’s failure was stated to be that he misses the point that one needs to know 
that one is looking for something, otherwise one should not be searching.53 The major 
point Merleau-Ponty makes here is that the empiricism is too poor as a doctrine, while 
the intellectualism is too rich as a doctrine.54 The empiricist uses the “searchlight”55 
of attention as “a general and unconditioned power in the sense that at any moment it 
can be applied indifferently to any content of consciousness”56. On the other hand, the 
intellectualist can recall anything from this self-sufficient mind, and the power of 
attention becomes uninteresting because the mind already prior to the direct 
experience has a concept of the experienced, and therefore for the rich intellectualist 
mind, it is not compelling to apply the power of attention to anything.57 “It [the power 
of attention] simply has no work to perform.”58 Merleau-Ponty draws an opinion that 
“[T]he inattentative perception contains nothing more and indeed nothing other than 
the attentative kind.”59  
                                                
53 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 33. 
54 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 32-33. 
55 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 30. 
56 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 31. 
57 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 33. 
58 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 32. 
59 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 32. 
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But according to Merleau-Ponty, there is some very important work to be done by 
the power of attention. The function of the attention is to create and establish a field to 
be investigated60. This field can be either perceptual or mental. And now, recall again 
the underlying principle question of this essay, in its modified version that we persons 
are to be searching for access to knowledge. And an important part of this access is 
found and established in form of this initial field created by the power of attention. 
And from here the process of development and learning are to be taking place. The 
very problem and defect of the traditional theories of empiricism and the 
intellectualism in the Cartesian tradition is that they give no room for the act of 
learning61.  
Merleau-Ponty wishes to return to that of searching for the knowledge. His 
phenomenological way of thinking encourages us persons to be curious about our 
environments and surroundings, and the directly experienced situations in which we 
find ourselves, in our ordinary lives. The purpose of his phenomenology is to help us 
to see and therefore also to rediscover our ordinary lived life at new.62 And at this 
point we can return to the second major problem faced by the intellectualist when it 
comes to that what we see, as contrasted with, what we ought to see. Lets return to the 
example of the wax as originally discussed by Descartes and then followed up by 
Merleau-Ponty. Remember, I already pointed out a moment ago that the material is to 
be intellectually understood as something called wax, although it can take and appear 
in different forms such as being solid and hard one moment, and a moment later 
appear as soft and fluid. Still, rationally and intellectually understood, we are talking 
and referring so a material called wax. Despite of these different appearances we use a 
logical activity of judging and we reason and conclude that the material under the 
investigation is wax, despite of its new form caused by the added heat. - But now, that 
of judging is based on a logical activity. Remember, there is a difference between that 
of logically judging and describing. With the other words, what we ought to see is not 
the same as what we see. - Scientifically and objectively there is nothing wrong in this 
conclusion. It is very useful in the sphere of the science. The solid and hard wax is not 
the same in its appearance as the soft and fluid wax. There is a difference in their 
composition. And this is what causes problems between the intellectually applied 
                                                
60 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 34. 
61 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 33. 
62 Matthews, Merleau-Ponty, A Guide for the Perplexed, p. 57. 
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judgement and what we actually see without aiming to see what we ought to see 
objectively.  
This has a parallel to that of describing us persons. Further short comings arise 
when the scientific knowledge is to be applied to that to cover that of being a person. 
The problem is that the scientific doctrines are not enough to cover all the aspects of 
that of being a person and for example seeing something else that what we objectively 
ought to see. In Merleau-Ponty’s own words the problem of intellectualism is 
expressed by saying that, in the sciences, which have such a domination role in the 
sphere of true knowledge ,  “perception is the ‘flaw’ in this ‘great diamond’ [of 
intellectualism]”63.  
 
 Now, let’s take up  “the act of learning”64 once again. Think about a child who 
sees an object which she is not able describe by the concept assigned to that object, in 
terms of the corresponding definition commonly used and accepted in the spoken 
language and further found in the established dictionaries. A scientist who daily 
works with this very same object, which a child sees but cannot find a proper concept 
for, has learned what this object is called and can tell us that the object is known as “a 
cathode ray tube”65. Although the child does not have a concept of the seen, she sees 
something, an object in its context. The child does not yet have a mental concept of 
the seen in terms of the language, but she will eventually hear it when someone tells 
her the name of that object. the child will learn what the object is called, and how it is 
used and by whom, and for what purpose. The child is developing her scope of 
knowledge. And here we are talking about the structure of our consciousness! The 
structure of our consciousness is not to be taken as something static and complete to 
start with, - neither will it ever reach a God-like standard of all-knowing and infinite 
knowledge. Although the child  does not know the proper name assigned to the 
object, she sees, it does not wipe away the fact that she sees something. Thus, the 
content of what the child sees is not empty or without meaning. The meaning changes 
and is rearranged when the child learns more. The structure of our consciousness 
changes and develops when we become conscious of the new concepts and practical 
                                                
63 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 241. 
64 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 31. 
65 Crane, “The nonconceptual content of experience”, p. 136. My example is based on the example 
given by Crane in his essay. 
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tasks of the life. Merleau-Ponty himself gives an example of a child who during his 
first nine months after the birth becomes aware of the colors.66 The child’s structure 
of the consciousness has changed during this time, and now the structure of the 
child’s consciousness includes that of recognizing a variety of colors. “A new 
dimension of an experience”67 has opened up to a child. Thus, the structure of our 
consciousness has a potential for development. This is what I mean by the 
transitoriness introduced in the introduction of my essay. Naturally, this has its root is 
the writings of Merleau-Ponty. After this has been said, I would like to round up this 
Part 2 on the historical developments with the following long quotation from 
Merleau-Ponty: 
 
“To pay attention is not merely further to elucidate pre-existing data, it is to bring 
about a new articulation of them by taking them as figures. They are performed only as 
horizons, they constitute in reality new regions in the total world. It is precisely the 
original structure which they introduce that brings out the identity of the object before and 
after the act of attention. Once the color-quality is acquired, and only by means of it, do 
the previous data appear as preparations of this quality. Once the idea of an equation has 
been acquired, equal arithmetical quantities appear as varieties of the same equation. it is 
precisely by overthrowing data that the act of attention is related to  previous acts, and the 
unity of consciousness is thus built up step by step through a ‘transition-synthesis’. The 
miracle of consciousness consists in its bringing to light, through attention, phenomena 
which re-establish the unity of the object in a new dimension at the very moment when 
they destroy it. Thus attention is neither an association of images, nor the return to itself 
of thought already in control  of its objects, but the active constitution of a new object 
which makes explicit and articulate what was until then presented as no more than an 
indeterminate horizon. At the same time as it sets attention in motion, the object is at 
every moment recaptured and placed once more in a state of dependence on it. It gives 
rise to the ‘knowledge-bringing event’ which is to transform it, only by means of the still 
ambiguous meaning which it requires that event to clarify; it is therefore the motive and 
not the cause of the event. But at least the act of attention is rooted in the life of 
consciousness, and one can finally understand how it emerges from its liberty of 
indifference and gives itself a present object. This passage from the indeterminate to the 
determinate, this recasting at every moment of its own history in the unity of a new 
meaning, is thought itself. ‘The work of mind exists only in act.’ The result of the act of 
attention is not to be found in its beginning.”68 
 
 
 
                                                
66 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 34-35. 
67 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 35. 
68 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 35-36. 
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Part 3 - Compromising the Case 
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Part 3 - Compromising the Case  
 
 
Chapter 7 - Towards Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenal field  
 
7.1 About the issues of the structure of the perceptual consciousness and the 
structure of the perceived.  
Now, please take a look of the six compositions on the next page before reading 
any further. 
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This example of compositions on the previous page is of my own, inspired by the 
writings of Merleau-Ponty. The reason for supplying this example is to provide it as a 
transition to the discussion concerning the structure of meaning as linked both to the 
structure of consciousness of us perceivers and to the structure of the compositions 
(that of perceived). Another way of expressing this is to say that this is to be linking 
together us persons and the world in which we live. 
My own example on the previous page is put forward in order to illustrate 
Merleau-Ponty’s point about that of the structure and the meaning, and how the 
structure and meaning are inseparable when taking perception as a source of 
knowledge. All of these six examples are composed of exactly the same principle 
elements of 2 long lines and of eight shorter lines. Merleau-Ponty would say about my 
example that the meaning of each composition, of the seen, will depend how the lines 
are organized. With the other words, the meaning will depend on the composition of 
the lines and what is the relation of these lines to each other. Look at the example one 
and the given ten lines forming a certain type of a composition. Look at the example 
two, the given ten lines forming another certain kind of a composition. Look at the 
third example, again, the given ten lines forming a third kind of a composition. And 
so on until the last of these compositions, the example number six. The point of this is 
that all of these compositions are linked to that of having a certain meaning.  
Now, recall the example of wax from the previous Part 2, on discussion 
concerning the intellectualism in relation to the power of attention and the logical 
activity of judging. - The ten lines in my example remain as individual elements 
understood analytically, just as Descartes concludes and claims that the wax remains 
in his example, although through one’s senses one can smell a different smell 
depending on if the wax is in its solid or melted form, see different shapes 
corresponding with solidity and fluidity, feel the softness of the wax which a moment 
earlier was felt as a hard, solid piece of wax a moments before the heat was applied to 
it. Merleau-Ponty’s point is that the composition of both Descartes’ and my examples, 
as viewed in terms of the sense-based perception, has changed. And the point of this 
is that there is a certain value, certain clue towards how a knowledge is searched and 
gained. 
As analytically understood, the lines (2 long lines and 8 short lines) are repeated 
in all compositions. This means that the lines are alike in all of these compositions if 
 57 
understood as individual objects by themselves. Thus, the lines are still lines, but, - 
now, please stay alert and pay attention -, the meaning that they carry varies from 
composition to composition, and depends on the composition they are linked to. The 
meaning when taken this way, cannot be separated from the figure.   
In all of these compositions concerning my lines, each composition has got a new 
meaning based on the rearrangement of the individual elements which still 
intellectually are understood as they were originally. Individually understood the 
elements of these compositions are just lines. I could say that ‘the same old individual 
elements’ are repeated in each composition. The above applies also for Descartes’ 
wax. The point here is that the meaning perceived is based on the very composition it 
represents. The meaning is inseparable from the structure of its composition. This 
acknowledgement is of great value, which carries a meaning and has a role in that 
how one searches and eventually gains knowledge through senses, thus through one’s 
bodily anchored situationality in the world, simply via the initial personal experience.  
 
Now, recall the discussion concerning the Modern paintings. Also, recall the 
discussion on Müller-Lyer’s optical illusion. And remember the issue of “error”. - It is 
of interest in this essay to discuss the differences and similarities between that of 
veridical knowledge and the knowledge provided by perceiving illusions. I would like 
to ask, if it is possible to claim that an illusion is not misleading the one who 
perceives? In a case where the illusion itself has a structure and meaning that misleads 
us in our relation to the objective world, the illusion is thought to be genuine by 
Merleau-Ponty, when “this [the] meaning originates in the source of sensation and 
nowhere else”69. This case needs to be studied further since it implies that the illusion 
carries some information and knowledge that is of essence for us, concerning the 
structure of illusion as well as the structure of our perceptual consciousness, in its 
capability of sincerely misleading us.  - What we see is what we see. What we see is 
not an “error”, it is just simply what we see. We see a “truth” in its own context.  
Well, after this has been said, I would like ask following questions: Can we 
picture any certainty in uncertainty? Could you accept the thought that the optical 
illusions, - both on paper and in the real world -, which we from time to time 
experience, are to be taken as sources of significant knowledge? - These questions 
                                                
69 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 24. 
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might sound very self-contradicting, but as a matter of fact, Merleau-Ponty aims to 
show that there is to be found something primary in that of uncertain. According to 
him, the optical illusions are to be taken seriously because by studying the optical 
illusions we can have access to, as well as we can learn, something very important 
about the structure of our perceptual consciousness and the structure of perceived.  
Now, I would like to ask the following: Under what conditions can it be justified 
for a claim that an illusion is authentically deceiving us, and that this truth of the 
given illusion implies that the structure of the illusion carries a meaning that is of 
essence? When we see something else than what we ought to see in a relation to the 
objective world and when the seen illusion cannot be explained by anything else than 
by its original meaning structure. This leads us to discover a true illusion that 
illustrates the difference between that of what we see and what we ought to see. With 
the other words, there is a difference between the objective world and the world of 
which we are apart of, and the world in which we exists and constantly perceive 
something.  This structure of the perceived also influences the structure of our 
consciousness. The structure of our consciousness changes over time and develops 
and becomes something else. Remember, there is a learning process, to which neither 
empiricism or intellectualism give place. The process of developing and learning from 
something unclear and indeterminate is ignored by both empiricism and 
intellectualism. It is important to give space for that of being ignorant in order to be 
able to find knowledge and to be able to learn. According to Merleau-Ponty, there is 
no room for ignorance within the traditional intellectualism. An illusion is analyzed 
and solved by the intellectualism in the terms of the objective world based on the 
guiding rule of clear and distinct perception as an operation of the mind. The 
analytical perception is capable of reducing the seen into that what we ought to see, 
but the analytical method cannot make us to see what we ought to see, nor can it 
understand what we see although the analytical method is capable of constructing the 
illusion. The clue here is not to construct the illusion. The clue is to see what kind of 
information and of authentic value does it carry in the relation to the foundation for 
our knowledge, about the world and about ourselves. For example, a situation which 
is difficult to be grasped by the analytical perception, is that of a symmetrical square 
placed right in the middle of a rectangle piece of paper.70 If one turns the sheet of 
                                                
70 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 54. 
 59 
paper, say 180 degrees around, by one’s analytical perception one will understand that 
the paper is turned around, and that one now is perceiving the square up side down, 
but one’s perception would not recognize the difference if one didn’t see the paper to 
be turned. There is no difference in the structure of the seen when the piece of paper is 
in its original position or if it is turned 180 degrees around. One’s perception is not 
aware of this change. But one is able to understand analytically that there is a change 
of position if the paper is the right way up, or if the paper is turned 180 degrees. 
Putting this with other words is that there is a difference between that of visually 
perceiving something, and that of understanding, and that that of visually perceiving 
something is not the same as understanding “that same”, (because they are not the 
same). One of Merleau-Ponty’s main claims is that the structure of the perceived is 
not separable from its meaning.  
 
To see what we see is to act in accordance with the perceptual arrangement of 
things or elements within the phenomenal field in which the constructional 
relationships are inseparable from the meaning that this cluster of data has a meaning 
as “a perceptual syntax”71, i.e. that the cluster of data has a meaning as it is presented 
within its constructional relationships instead that each element has a meaning prior to 
this. To this Merleau-Ponty refers as to rearrangement of the meaning. The important 
issue here is the constructional relationships of that of seen. To see “naturally” is to 
act in accordance with the perceptual structure. The objects we are familiar with, and 
which we know prior seeing them in a certain, specific perceptual context (perceptual 
field) are rearranged within their perceptual context. The meaning of the elements is 
not seen independently from their perceptual context, perceptual field. The meaning 
of the perceived is like a package, it comes in a package, -you have it all at once. The 
meaning of the seen is the sum of all the elements within the perceptual field. The 
individual elements understood by themselves can have a very different meaning 
when seen in isolation from the rest of the particular composition in question. But the 
point here is not to understand each element objectively as they are by themselves. 
We can analyze and explain each object, but this analytical perception is not of 
interest here. The interesting question is what do we see, instead of analyzing what we 
ought to see.  
                                                
71 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 42. 
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The judgemental error made in form of a false judgement while a cluster of data is 
opened up in from of one’s eyes as a perceptual “syntax” is not an error in its deeper 
sense, and that of applying the act of attention to a something initially unclear and 
indeterminate and starting to recapture the seen which was absorbed in one single 
stroke by the perceiver is a beginning of true ‘knowledge-bringing event’ taking place 
in the life of consciousness.72 
Merleau-Ponty has pawed the way and “opened up a phenomenal field”73 as a new 
dimension, which is also his starting point for re-discovering an old phenomenon of 
sense experience and thereafter describing his theory of (visual) perception. “Meaning 
is inseparable from the figure. This causes the problem of perception to reappear. “We 
construct the illusion, but we do not understand it.”74 This is where the perceptual 
field starts playing an essential role.” And the illusions are to be taken as valuable 
sources of information about the nature of our bodily existence, about the nature of us 
persons. 
 
 
Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
 
One way of understanding my approach, and Merleau-Ponty’s approach has been 
like having the question in the middle, and then seeing and pondering over the 
question from all different angles. The view has never from nowhere or from above 
from a God-like absolute and universal position from all perspectives simultaneously. 
The view has been, and is, always from somewhere.75 Our views are always given by 
our temporal bodily anchoring in the situations. Now, I take that the question under 
the investigation has been viewed, discussed, and circled around to some degree and 
the time has come to conclude and round up this essay. 
 
                                                
72 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 35-37. 
73 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 62. 
74 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 41. 
75 Matthews, Merleau-Ponty A Guide for the Perplexed, p.93. 
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8.1 Discussing the sphere of the Contemporary site-specific and situational 
visual artworks in the context of this essay 
I will conclude by discussing the sphere of Contemporary site-specific and 
situational visual artworks in the context of the said and done in this essay.  
Merleau-Ponty has said that we are to be returning to the ‘primitive’ life, to the 
pre-objective, to the pre-reflective, to the pre-theorizing, we are to just simply 
describe our everyday engagement here on the earth, in our daily surroundings and 
chores. We simply need to learn to relook the world. “’True philosophy’”76,  says 
Merleau-Ponty, ‘consists in relearning to look at the world’”77. For Merleau-Ponty, 
this true philosophy is his phenomenology. According to Merleau-Ponty, science has 
made the world to be a comfortable place, but now it is the time to train ourselves to 
see the ambiguity and the strange existence of the world. Merleau-Ponty compares 
this relearning to art: “like art, it does not simply represent a pre-existing truth, but 
forces us to see the world differently, and in that sense creates a new truth.”78  This is 
a way of returning to see how the things really are, returning to things in themselves 
through a direct experience.79 - Let me explain why I agree with the above. First of 
all, I take that that of looking at the works of visual arts, which are puzzling to us, 
start asking us question exactly for the reason that we are puzzled by them. And I see 
the genius in the artworks which show us our everyday life in a fresh context. Or vise 
versa, when our everyday context is shown to have a new content. Visual arts triggers 
us to ask questions we would not even consider asking otherwise. Thus, without these 
strange settings revealed to us with the help of arts, certain questions would not even 
exists to us. With the help of the visual arts, we can question about even the most 
obvious, about the things we take for given. We can question about a table, a chair, an 
apple, and what are their relations to each other. Visual arts set our habitual everyday 
life, meaning and relations, in different light. Arts do not need to act according to the 
rational and scientific laws and rules. The arts make our world uncomfortable at the 
times. They make us to loose our solid grip under our feet. This freshens up our 
customized, often forgotten wonder towards the world in which we live. 
                                                
76 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. xxiii. 
77 Matthews, Merleau-Ponty A Guide for the Perplexed, p.16. 
78 Matthews, Merleau-Ponty A Guide for the Perplexed, p.17. 
79 Matthews, Merleau-Ponty A Guide for the Perplexed, p.138. 
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The art works and the persons are to be seen parallel and as similar. Thus, 
according to Merleau-Ponty, a person is to be compared to a work of Modern art. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, only through our bodily existence we can have access to 
truth. That through body we have access to these pre-objective situations over which 
we are to reflect in order to arrive to knowledge. Thus, we need to understand us 
persons, in order to understand how to have access to knowledge. Merleau-Ponty 
communicates through his written words that: 
 
 “[T]he body is to be compared, not to a physical object, but rather to a work of art. In a 
picture or a piece of music the idea is incommunicable by means other than the display of 
colors and sounds. … A novel, poem, picture or musical work are individuals, that is, 
beings in which the expression is indistinguishable from the things expressed, their 
meaning, accessible only through direct contact, being radiated with no change of their 
temporal and spatial situation. It is in this sense that our body is comparable to a work of 
art. It is a nexus of living meanings, not the law for a certain number of covariant 
terms”80. 
 
Let’s take one more step back to the previous chapters. Thus, obviously 
knowledge has been an issue for Merleau-Ponty since he had taken up the criticism on 
the traditional theories. But what was actually the problem here? - Well, the objective, 
scientific truth and certain knowledge has been discussed and updated through out the 
times. This is fine for Merleau-Ponty. There is in one way nothing wrong in that of 
aiming to see the things objectively, it is just one kind of knowledge. But the problem 
for Merleau-Ponty rises when an individual, the one who observes, is taken 
categorically as any object of this world. This is not what Merleau-Ponty has in mind 
when taking up his phenomenology as a certain kind of anti-dogmatism. The 
traditional theories of empiricism and intellectualism are examples of dogmatism for 
Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty aims to get behind, deeper into the origins of the 
human existence in order to say how we can have access to knowledge. This he aims 
to achieve by describing how a person exists and lives in the everyday world. In this 
context the question of what do we see has been of great help in order to grasp what 
Merleau-Ponty means by this. Merleau-Ponty’s interest has not been in a 
                                                
80 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 174.  
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transcendental81 subject in a sense of being objectified and standing outside of a 
given situation. His interest is in a situated82 subject where the subject has a particular 
view point from where he perceives. It is in this contextuality of situated, and non-
transcendental where the Contemporary site-specific and situational artworks will be 
taken into discussion. Here, I will quote Matthews’ words concerning Merleau-
Ponty’s interest in the Modern painting: 
 
“The relation between the various objects and planes depicted in a modern painting is 
a relation in which they stand to a subject, the painter or the person viewing the painting, 
not some kind of a impersonal relationship to a point in the world, such as a human retina 
or the film in the back of the camera. The painter is trying to reveal a truth about the 
world as he or she lives it, a world experienced as meaningful for him or her. This truth is 
revealed by constructing on canvas a world which embodies those meanings. The subject 
does not merely represent objective truth: subject and object are inseparably 
intertwined.”83 
 
But here I agree with the first part of Matthews’ claim, but I do not agree that the 
viewer who is not the painter himself, is standing in some kind of a personal 
relationship to the art work. I claim that the artwork is still impersonal to the viewer, 
there is a distance between the art works and the viewer. The Modern art is still 
viewed, when taking the standpoint other than that of the artist, as objectified, and not 
as a direct subject-object relationship as it was desired by Merleau-Ponty. In Modern 
art there still was the subject-object differentiation and division, as well as a barrier 
between the observer and the work of art, despite of that the barrier was deleted 
between the artist and his creation.  
It has been claimed that Merleau-Ponty did not solve the problem of not ending up 
scientifically reflecting over the direct sense experience. There is a difference between 
that of experiencing something directly and describing it. Describing is not the same 
as experiencing something. The direct sense experience is an immediate experience 
between the perceiver and the world, while describing the direct sense experience 
rather belongs to the sphere of the theorizing and reflecting over the direct sense 
experience.  
                                                
81 Matthews, Merleau-Ponty, A guide for the Perplexed, p. 34. 
82 Matthews, Merleau-Ponty, A guide for the Perplexed, p. 34. 
83 Matthews, Merleau-Ponty, A guide for the Perplexed, p. 138. 
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- That of bringing in the Modern Arts was Merleau-Ponty’s contribution. My 
contribution was to go even step further, along Matthews’ acknowledgement in the 
context of the prevailing times we are living in, and to bring in the Contemporary site 
specific and situational artworks. I take this to link Merleau-Ponty’s work to a actual 
philosophical debate of today. As a historical fact of Merleau-Ponty’s time, the 
contemporary site-specific, situational art works were still long ahead of his time, and 
all what was available to him was the then prevailing works of Modern art. I believe 
that in the present context of the Contemporary site-specific and situational visual 
artworks the time is mature to discuss the interwoven play of the subjective sphere 
and the objective sphere. All five senses are activated as is the intellectual action of 
reflecting. As I already mentioned, the traditional subject-object relation was still too 
strongly present and dominant in the Modern artworks. And this was exactly what 
Merleau-Ponty was to eliminate, the clear distinction between the subjective and the 
objective positions. This is, of course, a very primitive and superficial way of putting 
this question. The underlying idea was that the subjective experience is immediate 
and personal while the objective position involves that of stepping a side from one’s 
current subjective position. So the question, or the problem becomes, how to 
intertwine more completely these two very different positions. By definition, that of 
taking an objective position involves that of reflecting over and also describing 
something, for example that what we see. That of seeing something and experiencing 
that of seeing is not the same as describing what we see. Characteristically these 
situations are distinct. So how to shift our position to be something different than our 
everyday positions without loosing contact with the subjective sphere while stepping 
on the side? That is what the question becomes to. - My solution to this is by taking in 
the Contemporary works of arts. The Contemporary art works provide this condition, 
or situationality through our bodily awareness which is necessary, in order to still be 
in-oneself subjectively through the sense experiences, while at the same time being 
provided a new perspective of seeing an everyday situation such as cooking a dinner 
and eating in a social setting together with others84, seeing a table, or a chair. And 
therefore, also providing a situation, an environment where one can simultaneously 
have contact with the basic sense experience such as seeing as well as reflecting over 
the given situation of the changed perspective and therefore at the same time being in-
                                                
84 Here I refer to the artworks done by Rirkrit Tiravanija (born 1961). 
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oneself, and being a part, taking a step on the side from one’s everyday sensed life 
experiences. In the Contemporary art works the subject-object relation is wiped away 
in a simple act that one literally walks into a work of art. One does not stay at the 
distance and stare the artwork. One has become an integrated part of the artwork, 
where one’s actions play an active role. The big underlying message is that the 
meaning of that of being a person, and living a life is inseparable from the actions we 
both are involved with and are taking. The “beauty” and “genius” of the 
Contemporary site-specific and situational artworks lays in that of involving us. And 
in that that the everyday objects and situations are given a new arrangement and 
therefore a meaning through their use. The objects are altered and therefore the 
situations are altered too, or vise versa. Their expected functions are not there as 
expected habitually. We understand conceptually what the objects are, but we cannot 
use them as we expect. Maybe a chair is too small, or too large, or maybe the chair is 
consisting just of beams of light rays cast in the air. Maybe we can still use the chair, 
but the chair does not function as we would expect in a relation to our bodies. There is 
a mismatch between our conceptual and habitual understanding of the objects and the 
situations and therefore also we person also see ourselves in a new light. This is the 
true way of removing the distance between the objective and the subjective spheres. 
One is simultaneously in both spheres while in the Contemporary site-specific and 
situational artworks.  And Merleau-Ponty was after to remove the distance between 
that of the theorist and how he threats perception. Merleau-Ponty hoped that in his 
phenomenological approach, the distance between himself and that how he threats the 
perception would be “vanished”. This was the intention of his actions, but in the 
reality he did not quite achieve his goal, the merged situation. But he did achieve to 
show that the meaning is inseparable from its context, and this by itself is a great 
achievement, which again has paved the way to the further discoveries and new 
knowledge. Such as that of claiming that the Contemporary arts are one way of 
proposing the solution to Merleau-Ponty’s question. Arts provide one way of 
rearranging the familiar everyday objects and situations, environments. The 
arrangements and the composition is new, and this also leads to a new meaning for us 
to ponder over. Maybe the meaning is strange, unclear, undetermined at the moment 
of its expose, but anyhow, it is there, and it is to be reflected over. And maybe 
eventually it leads to something fresh and new, clear and determinate. That of 
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uncertainty is an valuable aspect of our lives, as is that of certainty. A new perceptual 
field has opened up in front of our eyes.  
 
But why was the Modern painting so important to Merleau-Ponty in that of 
revealing something fresh about our everyday life? - Because, according to Merleau-
Ponty, the Modern painting both offers and exposes us something that we have no 
clear idea what it could be. In certain cases we don’t have a slightest idea what we are 
looking at. And that what we have “left” with, is only the action, that is what we 
experience in its purest form. We as adults are returned to the level which a child 
experiences and faces when she looks at a “cathode ray tube”85. - Recall the discussed 
on learning from the previous chapters. Child sees something without yet having a 
concept of it. And it is here that we have returned to the things-in-themselves how 
they really are, and therefore also we have returned to the true perception! This is of 
the greatest essence to Merleau-Ponty. We have returned to a situation to which we 
are bodily awareness, through bodily awareness where the action of learning surfaces.  
The aim is to learn to see the world as we look at the arts, and to rediscover and to 
learn to appreciate the world as strange and unclear, and indeterminate. By this way 
we can through perception return to things themselves how they really are. 
As the final concluding remark, I will return to the very beginning of this essay, 
and to my belief that we persons are always fasten upon our situationality, and that 
physically we persons can never leave our present situationality in the world, while 
our thoughts can travel along the time line of past, present and future. - Based on the 
said and done in this essay, I believe that it should be acknowledged that the mind 
can, and should  travel to the memories and the history, stay at the present, and direct 
its thoughts towards the future and the coming, while we persons inhabiting our 
bodies will always stay physically situated in this world, at any given time. I don’t see 
any conflict in this set up. My whole body is mine, and composed of me.86 I live and 
think in and from my body. I use my body.87 “I am my body.”88 My multiple actions, 
                                                
85 Crane, “The nonconceptual content of experience”, p.136 
86 Matthews, Merleau-Ponty, A guide for the Perplexed, p. 51. 
87 Matthews, Merleau-Ponty, A guide for the Perplexed, p. 42. 
88 Matthews, Merleau-Ponty, A guide for the Perplexed, p. 51. 
 67 
taking place simultaneously, such as concluding this essay by typing these words89, 
and thinking what to say, are taken through my body. Typing takes place through my 
fingers pressing the keys, one after another, on my Apple PowerBook. That of 
thinking is recognizable through my half loud spoken words spoken to myself. The 
aspects of the bodily awarness and the thinking mind form together in a unity the 
primary of us persons. These aspects are different, and they are not to be equal, while 
brought together in an intertwined position. The “beauty” of these spheres is that they 
are different from each other while they compliment each other and build a larger 
whole together.  They will always exists together and be understood in the context of 
each other, anchored and seen and recognized here in our daily world.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
89 Matthews, Merleau-Ponty, A guide for the Perplexed, p. 42. Similar example of typing is given by 
Matthews, where he makes the point that my body is mine, and nobody else’s. Thus, the subjective 
experience is mine, through my body.  
 68 
Literature list: 
1. Art in Theory 1900-1990, An Anthology of Changing Ideas, edited by 
Charles Harrison & Paul Wood, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, Oxford, UK, 
1992, Maurice Merleau-Ponty from ‘Eye and Mind’ p.750-754 (4 pages). 
2. Descartes, Rene, The Philosophical writings of Descartes, volume II, 
Translated by Cottingham John, Murdoch Dugald, Stoothoff Robert, 
Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 17-62 (45 pages).     
3. Crane, Tim, “The nonconceptual content of experience”. In: Tim Crane 
(ed.), The Contents of Experience. Essays on Perception. Cambridge 1992 
(CUP), p. 136 – 157 (21 pages). 
4. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Second Edition, General Editor 
Robert Audi, Cambridge University Press, UK, 2001.  
5. Hatfield, Gary, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Descartes and the 
Meditations, Routledge 2003, p. vii-xxi (14 pages) and 1-280 (280 pages). 
6. The New Lexicon, Webster’s Dictionary of the English Language, Lexicon 
Publications Inc, NY, 1989. 
7. Matthews, Eric, Merleau-Ponty, A Guide for the Perplexed, Continuum 
International Publishing Group, London and New York, 2006, p. 1-160 (160 
pages). 
8. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, Phenomenology of Perception, translated by Colin 
Smith, Routledge Classics by Routledge, 2002, p.v-xxiv (19 pages), 
introduction p. 1-74 (74 pages), Part I The Body p. 75-200 (125 pages).  
9. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, TheWorld of Perception, translated by Oliver 
Davis, Routledge Classics by Routledge, 2008, p.1-95 (95 pages).  
10. The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy, Edited by Thomas Mautner, Penguin 
Books, London, 2000. 
 
(All together 837 pages) 
 
 
 
 
